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Abstract
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new healthcare position in
Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line
with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the
trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and
equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide
more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25% decrease in child
malnutrition.
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1 Introduction
Economic development entails the professionalization of public service delivery: qualified, career
professionals replace informal providers with strong connection to beneficiaries, willing to work for
little pay (Northcote and Trevelyan 1853; Weber 1922; North 1991). This shift fosters an identity
based on a career in the civil service, but agents with altruistic preferences towards beneficiaries
may be necessary for effective public service delivery (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Besley and Ghatak
2005; Prendergast 2007; Brehm and Gates 1999; Wilson 1989). To what extent does professional-
ization crowd out those who care most deeply about their beneficiaries, and what impact does it
have on welfare?1
This paper provides the first experimental evidence on whether these identities attract different
agents and whether this selection determines the effectiveness of service delivery. Does a career
in the civil service attract talent at the expense of prosociality? Does it draw in agents who
underperform relative to those attracted by “doing good”?2 Or does it attract agents who are
neither talented nor prosocial but attracted by the opportunity to extract rents? Understanding
the conditions under which such trade-offs occur is critical to informing theory and to settling the
policy debate on whether rewards for service delivery agents should be kept low so as to screen out
individuals without altruistic preferences.
We design a nationwide recruitment experiment to identify causal impacts on the applicant
pool, on the recruited agents, and on their performance. We collaborate with the Government
of Zambia as they formalize primary health care in remote rural areas by creating a new health
worker position in the civil service. This cadre is meant to replace informal service provision by
religious and other charitable organizations, thereby following the typical evolution of the modern
state. The stakes are high because, due to the shortage of medical staff, hiring effective agents can
make a great difference for the quality of health services and, ultimately, health outcomes in these
communities.
Our experiment varies the salience of a career in civil service at the recruitment stage, exploiting
the fact that this position is new to potential applicants. In control districts, the recruitment
ads reflect the status quo before the new position, when local health services were provided by
individuals hired by non-governemntal and charitable organizations. Helping the community is
listed as the main benefit, and local agents are listed as peers. In treatment districts the ads are
designed to highlight the civil servant identity: career advancement is listed as the main benefit,
and doctors and nurses are listed as peers. Treatment and control posters differ only in the salience
of career opportunities, while all other factors such as application requirements are kept equal.
To isolate the effect of selection on performance, we must sever the link between treatment and
the marginal return to effort on the job. To this end, all hired agents are given the same information
1This echoes the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the job (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006).
2Ambition towards a career in public service, with both its ability to attract the most able but also the most
self-interested, has a long intellecutal history; ambition was used by Romans, as ambitio, exclusively to refer to those
in public life. In De officiis, Cicero referred to ambitio as a “malady” that can cause individuals to “lose sight of
their claims to justice,” but one that seems to draw “the greatest souls” and “most brilliant geniuses”.
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on career opportunities and social impact when they move to the same training school where they
are trained together for one year, before deployment. A survey administered before and after the
training program validates our design: before training, treatment and control agents differ in the
perceived relevance of career benefits, but after training these perceptions converge.
The new health worker position effectively adds career opportunities to a job with social impact.
A simple conceptual framework makes precise that, in line with prevailing policy concerns, this
attracts applicants who are less prosocial conditional on a given level of talent. However, since the
outside option is increasing in talent, adding career benefits will draw in more talented individuals,
and the marginal, most talented applicant in both groups will have the highest prosociality. The
treatment effect on recruited candidates will therefore depend on how candidates are chosen from the
pool. If applicants are drawn randomly, there might be a trade-off between talent and prosociality.
However, if only the most talented are hired, there will be no trade-off.
To evaluate the impact of treatment on the applicant pool and on hired candidates we collect
information on the skills and prosociality of every applicant. This exercise reveals that, in line with
common intuition, the average applicant in treatment is more talented and less prosocial. In line
with the theoretical intuition, however, the most talented applicants have the same, high level of
prosociality. We show that the selection panels in both treatment and control put a high weight
on talent, leading them to recruit among the most talented in their pool; as a result, treatment
recruits are more talented and equally prosocial.
To evaluate the impact of treatment on service delivery we combine three data sources: real-
time data on service delivery in remote areas collected through a mobile platform, administrative
data on health facility utilization, and our own survey of household health practices and outcomes,
including immunization records and anthropometrics. This allows us to link the services delivered
by the newly recruited health workers to the outcomes of the households who receive those services
and, ultimately, their health impact.
We find that agents drawn by career opportunities are more effective at each step of the causal
chain from the inputs they provide to the outcomes of the recipients. They provide more inputs
(29% more household visits, twice as many community meetings) at the same cost. They increase
facility utilization rates: the number of women giving birth at the health center is 30% higher,
and the number of children undergoing health checks 24% higher, being weighed 22% higher, and
receiving immunization against polio 20% higher. They improve a number of health practices
among the households they serve: breastfeeding and proper stool disposal increase by 5 and 12
percentage points (pp), respectively, deworming treatments by 16%, and the share of children on
track with their immunization schedule by 5pp (relative to a control mean of 6%). These changes
are matched by changes in objective health outcomes: the share of children under age 5 who are
underweight falls by 5pp.
Taken together, these results indicate that offering a civil service position with career oppor-
tunities attracts agents who deliver services with remarkable health impact in the communities.
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The fact that we observe consistently positive impacts from three distinct and entirely independent
data sources further strengthens our confidence in the findings.
In light of the evidence of poor bureaucratic performance in low-income countries (Collier 2009;
Muralidharan et al. 2011) our findings suggest that this is not due to the fact that civil service
careers attract poor performers when these jobs are first created.
The study of how individuals sort into jobs according to their preferences, skills, and the jobs’
own attributes has a long tradition in economics (Roy 1951). More recently this has been enriched
by the study of job missions as a selection and motivation mechanism (Besley and Ghatak 2005)
and identity or self-image as components of preferences (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Bénabou and
Tirole 2011). Our findings provide empirical support to these contributions as we show that the
identity associated with the job affects those drawn to it and that this selection affects performance.
The fact that career opportunities affect performance through selection complements the recent
findings of Bertrand et al. (2016) that, on the intensive margin, better promotion prospects improve
the effectiveness of Indian civil servants. Our findings also complement a large literature on the
impact of financial incentives. On the selection margin, Dal Bó et al. (2013) and Deserranno (2019)
study the effect of earnings levels on the traits of applicants for government and NGO jobs3 while
several papers evaluate the effect of performance pay on the performance of agents after these have
been hired either for the delivery of health services (Ashraf et al. 2014; Miller et al. 2012; Miller
and Babiarz 2014; Celhay et al. 2019) or education (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011; Duflo
et al. 2012; Glewwe et al. 2010; Fryer 2013; Rockoff et al. 2012; Staiger and Rockoff 2010). Our
contribution is to provide the first experimental evidence that selection affects performance in public
service delivery. In particular, we show that job design, of which incentives are a component, affects
who sorts into these jobs in the first place, and that the effect of this selection on performance is
of the same order of magnitude as the largest incentive effects estimates.4,5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and research
design. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework to make precise the trade-off between talent and
prosociality, and Section 4 tests for it in the applicant pool and among recruited candidates. Section
5 evaluates the treatment effect on performance in delivering health services. Section 6 evaluates the
treatment effect on facility utilization, health behaviors, and health outcomes. Section 7 concludes
with a discussion of external validity, welfare implications, and general equilibrium effects relevant
for program scale-up.
3Dal Bó et al. (2013) find that higher salaries for civil service jobs attracts better qualified candidates with the
same level of prosocial preferences. Deserranno (2019) finds that expectations of higher earnings discourage prosocial
candidates from applying for an NGO job that encompasses both commercial and health promotion activities. While
consistent with these selection effects, our experiment focuses on measuring the effect of selection on agents’ perfor-
mance and beneficiaries’ outcomes, which encompasses the effect of all the attributes that determine effectiveness.
4There is a corresponding literature that studies the same issues in the private sector. This literature stresses the
importance of the effect of incentives on selection, but empirical studies focus on incentives on the job (Lazear and
Oyer, 2012; Oyer and Schaefer, 2011).
5Rothstein (2015) uses a model-based approach that simulates the selection effect of alternative teachers’ contracts.
He finds that bonus policies have small effects on selection while reductions in tenure rates accompanied by substantial
salary increases and high firing rates can have larger effects.
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2 Context and Research Design
2.1 Context: Health Services in Rural Communities
Delivering health services to remote rural areas is challenging at every level of development because
trained medical staff are reluctant to be posted there and turnover rates are high (World Health
Organization 2006).6 In Zambia, the average health post (the first-level government health facility)
had 1.5 staff from the Ministry of Health, including those not permanently based there. The govern-
ment community health assistant (CHA) position was created as a solution to this challenge. The
position is meant to put formally trained government health staff in place of informal community
health workers employed, often as volunteers, by religious and other non-profit organizations.7 In
fact, the title of the newly created government position was changed to “Community Health Assis-
tant” shortly after its inception precisely to distinguish it from the informal, untrained community
health workers.
In 2010, the program’s first year, the Government sought to recruit, train, and deploy two health
workers to each of 167 communities in 48 districts. The main task of CHAs is to visit households
and refer them to health facilities as needed. The job requires both medical and social skills
(World Health Organization 2006). Medical skills include weighing, taking vital signs, filling out
patient registries, and determining whether a patient is pregnant. Social skills include counselling,
supporting, advising, and educating patients and other laypeople.
Government-funded community health worker programs vary in the extent to which they inte-
grate the health workers into the civil service. At one extreme there are programs that mimic the
informal model with financing provided by the government and all other decisions including hiring,
monitoring, and firing left to the non-governmental sector. At the other extreme is the model
adopted in this program in Zambia where health workers become a cadre of civil servants and can
advance to higher-ranked and better-paid cadres. The pay gradient is steep as the starting monthly
wage is USD 290 for CHAs and USD 530 for entry-level nurses.8 Promotion into higher-ranked
6The US Health Resources and Services Administration estimates that 1 in 2 rural Americans lives in a medically
underserved area with a shortage of primary care providers (PCPs), defined as a population-to-PCP ratio of greater
than 3,500:1 (US Human Resources and Service Administration 2019).
7The history of community health work goes back at least to the early 17th century, when a shortage of doctors
in Russia led to training community volunteers in providing basic medical care to military personnel. This role
later became formalized with China’s “barefoot doctors,” laypeople who sometimes could not afford shoes but were
trained to meet primary health needs in rural areas, and then became widespread in Latin America, in underserved
areas in the United States, and, more recently, across Africa (La Familia Sana Program 1992; Perez and Martinez
2008). The original programs emphasized community self-reliance and participation. Like much of informal public
service delivery, for example in the United Kingdom in the 18th and 19th centuries, these are provided by religious
institutions, grassroots movements, and, more recently, non-governmental organizations. For this reason, however,
they are often uncoordinated, lower-skilled efforts.
8At the time of the launch of the recruitment process in September 2010, the Government had not yet determined
how much the health workers would be formally remunerated. Accordingly, the posters did not display any information
about compensation. Although the health worker wage was unknown to applicants at the time of application (indeed,
unknown even to the Government), applicants would likely have been able to infer an approximate wage, or at least
an ordinal wage ranking, based on the “community health” job description and the relatively minimal educational
qualifications required—both of which would intuitively place the job below facility-based positions in compensation.
In Section 2.2, we present evidence against the hypothesis that wage perceptions may have differed by treatment.
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cadres within the Ministry requires additional training (for example, nursing or medical school).
Being part of the civil service, the health workers are eligible for in-service training, meaning that
they attend school while continuing to receive salary and in some cases receive sponsorship of tu-
ition as well. The official policy of the Ministry is to periodically ask the district medical officers to
nominate a number of candidates on merit, but there is no mechanical link between quantitative
measures of performance (say, the number of visits that a health worker makes) and nominations.
Promotions to higher cadres are therefore not automatic, but the expected payoff is high even with
low success rates, especially because job opportunities that allow for a career in central government
are rare in the remote communities from which the health workers are recruited.9
The Government chose the latter model in the hope of attracting agents with strong technical
skills to do community work. Nevertheless, they were fully aware that the focus on career advance-
ment could backfire by crowding out applicants motivated to help the community.10 The possibility
of this trade-off led to the experiment we describe below.
2.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment aims to assess whether a career in civil service attracts talent at the expense of
prosociality, and whether this affects who is hired and their performance. This is relevant to evaluate
the role of selection in public service delivery beyond health services in low-income countries, as
the concern that material rewards attract the wrong types is pervasive. The key challenge is to
separate the effect of selection from the effect of incentives on the job. We tackle this in two steps:
the first opens the selection channel, and the second shuts down the incentive channel.
Experimental Design, Step I: Opening the Selection Channel
To open the selection channel we use the recruitment posters and the information materials dis-
tributed to health officers. In each community, paper advertisements for the job were posted in
local public spaces, such as schools, churches, and the health post itself. District health officials
were responsible for ensuring that the recruitment posters were posted.
To ensure that the recruitment process was carried out in a uniform manner across all the
communities, the Government included detailed written instructions in the packets containing the
recruitment materials (posters, applications, etc.) that were distributed to district health officials
(see Appendix F).
9As of 2019, Ministry of Health records show that five of the original 307 CHAs have applied for higher-level
professional training (two in registered nursing, two in public health nursing, and one in registered midwifery).
Of these five, three were accepted by their training schools and granted study leave by the Ministry, with the
understanding that, upon completing their programs, they would cease to work as CHAs and instead assume their
new professional roles.
10Mr. Mwila, then Human Resources Director at the Ministry of Health, expressed this trade-off clearly when he
asked us: “What is going to happen now that they (potential health workers) will see themselves as civil servants?
Will they be connected to the community?”
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The treatment poster stresses the civil service identity of the new position. It lists as the main
benefit of the job the opportunity to ascend the civil-service career ladder to higher and better-paid
positions such as environmental health technician, nurse, clinical officer, and doctor. This incentive
is summarized in a bold caption stating, “Become a community health worker to gain skills and
boost your career!” The poster also explicitly leverages a sense of belonging to the civil service by
stating “become a highly trained member of Zambia’s health care system”. Finally it sets “experts
in medical fields” as the peer group.
The control poster uses the standard approach of recruiting community health workers, stressing
the social identity of the position by making salient community impact such as “[gaining] the skills
you need to prevent illness and promote health for your family and neighbors”. The message is
summarized in a caption stating, “Want to serve your community? Become a community health
worker!” Finally, it lists local health post staff as the peer group candidates can expect to interact
with.
Three points are of note. First, the social identity poster functions as control because the status
quo community health worker jobs do not offer career opportunities. Second, treatment and control
posters have exactly the same structure except the wording of the benefits. We chose this over a
“neutral” control poster with no benefits whatsoever because in that case, the treatment effect
would conflate the effect of interest with the effect of advertising benefits per se. While this might
be of intrinsic interest, it would not allow us to answer the more general question of how agents
who are attracted by a career in the civil service differ from those attracted by social impact and
how this selection affects performance. Third, it is important to note that in these communities
government jobs are scarce; therefore, a poster advertising a government job is likely to be highly
visible.
Since recruitment was organized by district officials, we randomized treatment at the district
level in order to maximize compliance with the experimental assignment, evenly splitting the 48
districts into two groups. This implies that each district official is only exposed to one treatment and
is unaware of the other. As district officials are the main source of information for aspiring health
workers, randomization at the district level minimizes the risk of contamination. Randomization
at the district level also mitigates the risk of informational spillovers between communities, as
the distance between health posts in different districts is large. Random assignment of the 48
districts is stratified by province and average district-level educational attainment.11 To ensure
compliance with the randomization protocol, we worked closely with the Government to standardize
the information given to the district officials to organize the recruitment process.12
11We stratify by the proportion of adults in the district who have a high school diploma, as reported in the most
recent Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, conducted by the Central Statistical Office four years prior in 2006. We
sort districts by province and, within each province, by high school graduation rate. Within each sorted, province-
specific list of districts, we take each successive pair of districts and randomly assign one district in the pair to the
career opportunities treatment and the other to the control group. For provinces with an odd number of districts,
we pool the final unpaired districts across provinces, sort by educational attainment, and randomize these districts
in the same pair-wise manner.
12District officials are given a packet containing 10 recruitment posters and 40 application forms for each health
post and are asked to distribute each packet to the respective health center and, from there, to ensure that recruitment
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Table A.1 reports balance tests on three sets of variables that can affect the supply of health
workers, the demand for their services, and their working conditions. Overall, Table A.1 shows
that the new health workers are recruited from similar areas and will work in similar areas. Besides
showing balance between treatment and control, this exercise is useful to understand labor markets
in rural Zambia. Two findings are of note. First, only 4.4% of the population have the necessary
credentials (grade 12 education) to apply. Second, and more strikingly, just over half of the eligible
were either out of work or in unpaid employment over the past twelve months.13 Among the 45%
engaged in income-generating activities (either as employees or self-employed), fewer than one-
third are employed in high-skill occupations (such as teachers, which account for 9% of the eligible
population), and about half are employed in low-skill occupations, mostly in agriculture, which
accounts for 18% of the eligible population. Given the scarcity of skilled jobs, the program might
have the added benefit of creating job opportunities in these communities.
Experimental Design, Step II: Closing the Incentive Channel
To close down the incentive channel, all successful applicants are eligible forcareer opportunities
once hired. After being recruited, all agents train together for one year, during which they receive
the same information about the career opportunities they are entitled to as civil servants. As
treatment and control health workers face the same incentives once hired, performance differences,
if any, are attributable to selection.
The experiment aims to create differences in career opportunities at the application stage and
then to eliminate these differences after candidates have been hired. To check whether it succeeded,
we ask all agents about perceived benefits of the job when they first arrive at the training school
in June 2011 and then again twenty-two months later in April-May 2013, which is after they have
completed the one-year training. To elicit this information, we give each health worker a bag of 50
beans and ask them to allocate the beans to different cards describing potential benefits of the job.
This method has two desirable features: (i) it forces respondents to take into account the trade-off
between different benefits, namely that giving more weight to one benefit necessarily implies that
other benefits will be given less weight, and (ii) it allows us to test whether the treatment affected
other benefits besides career advancement and community service.
There are two sources of potential desirability bias, which might affect the magnitude of the
treatment effects but not their sign. First, the fact that respondents say what they think the
posters are posted, application forms are made available, and so forth. We conduct a series of follow-up calls over
several weeks to the district point-persons to ensure that the recruitment process is conducted as planned. To
reinforce the treatment, we also include a basic written script that the district officials are invited to use to inform
health centers and neighborhood health committees on the health worker program and recruitment process. In
the career opportunities treatment, the script describes the new program as follows: “This is an opportunity for
qualified Zambians to obtain employment and to advance their health careers. Opportunities for training to advance
to positions such as Nurse and Clinical Officer may be available in the future.” In contrast, in the control group, the
script states, “This is an opportunity for local community members to become trained and serve the health needs of
their community.” (see Appendix F).
13The 28% who were out of work are either unemployed (13%), housewives (7.5%), or full time students (8.5%).
Most (65%) of the unpaid jobs are in agriculture. These are balanced across treatments.
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enumerators want to hear based on the information given on the posters does not invalidate this
exercise; the aim of the exercise is precisely to test whether the information they have matches that
given on the posters. Second, the fact that this is a community-based position, named “Community
Health Worker,” might lead the health workers to overstate community benefits. This will bias
the share put on community benefits upwards and the difference between treatments downwards,
making it less likely for us to be able to detect a difference between treatment and control. This
should be kept in mind when interpreting the magnitudes reported below.
The answers tabulated in Table A.2 show that differences in the perceived benefits reported by
the health workers when they first arrive at the training school match those advertised in treatment
and control posters and then disappear after the health workers are exposed to the training program.
Table A.2, Panel A, shows that service to the community is listed as the main benefit in both groups.
This might truly reflect preferences or be inflated by desirability bias as discussed above. Despite
the fact that this biases treatment effects towards zero, we find that the treatment group places 38%
more weight on career opportunities (p=0.002) and lower weight on both “allows me to serve the
community” and “earn respect and status in the community” (p=0.046 and p=0.031, respectively).
All other benefits are balanced across groups, suggesting that the poster did not convey different
expectations about pay on the job or the nature of the job.
Table A.2, Panel B, shows that the answers converge after exposure to training and that there
are no significant differences between the two groups. In line with the fact that control health
workers receive information about career opportunities during training, the weight they give to
career opportunities rises by 27%, while the weight they give to service to the community falls by
15%. In contrast, treatment health workers, who receive no new information during training, do
not change their answers.
The experimental design allows us to identify the effect of career opportunities on performance
through selection if the salience of career opportunities at the recruitment stage does not affect the
agents’ behavior directly once the real career opportunities are known by both treatment and control
health workers. This assumption fails if control agents react to the difference between advertised
and actual benefits, rather than to the benefits themselves. If control agents value career benefits
this will bias the treatment estimates downwards as they might respond to the positive surprise
by working harder. Symmetrically, estimates will be biased upwards if control agents dislike career
benefits or dislike finding out that the actual value of career opportunities is larger than the value
advertised. Note that in this case, agents for whom the participation constraint is met ex-ante but
not ex-post would drop out once hired. For instance, Deserranno (2019) finds that NGO health
promoters who receive a negative surprise on earnings are 14pp more likely to drop out than those
who do not over a two-year period. In contrast, the drop out rate of control CHAs was zero over
the same period, and only 3% of those who started training did not complete it.
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3 Framework
The experiment can be modelled as a three-stage game. In Stage 1, potential applicants choose
whether to apply based on the information conveyed by the posters. In Stage 2, the panels select the
CHAs from the applicant pool. In Stage 3, the selected applicants choose how much effort to exert
on the job. Our treatment occurs at Stage 0, where we assign different posters to different districts
so the information applicants have in Stage 1 depends on whether their district is in treatment or
control.
Applicants differ in ability, a ≥ 0, and social preferences towards the community, s ∈ [0, 1], or
prosociality for short. Below we make precise why both are desirable for successful applicants. Gen-
eral ability a comprises all cognitive (IQ) and non-cognitive (ambition, tenacity, work ethic) skills
that make individuals productive in all occupations. Prosociality determines the utility individuals
get from helping others, in this case by improving their health status. We assume that ability and
prosociality are independently distributed in the population. If selected as a CHA, an individual
exerts effort, e ≥ 0, to produce community health according to H(a, e) which is increasing in a and
e, generating utility sH(a, e) net of disutility of effort d(e). We assume that output is concave in
effort, so Hee ≤ 0, and also that ability and effort may be complementary, i.e. Hae ≥ 0, reflecting
the idea that a given unit of effort for a highly talented CHA may generate more health output
than a given unit of effort for a less talented CHA. To ensure an interior solution, we set d′ > 0 and
d′′ > 0. All selected CHAs also receive material benefits equal to M , which can be thought of as
reflecting the discounted sum of future wages; these accrue to all agents regardless of performance.
We proceed via backwards induction.
3.1 Stage 3: Selected Applicants’ Choice of Effort
If hired, the agent chooses e to maximize U(a, s, e,M) = sH(a, e) − d(e) +M . By the convexity
of d, this yields an interior e∗(a, s) ≥ 0 that satisfies de∗
ds
> 0 and de
∗
da
≥ 0. This implies a realized
health output function H∗(a, s) ≡ H(a, e∗(a, s)) with H∗a > 0 and H∗s > 0. This means that
both ability and prosociality contribute to generating health output through different channels:
prosociality increases effort, while ability increases output directly for any given level of effort and
may also increase effort if Hae > 0. This is the foundation of the trade-off: if career benefits lead
to hiring CHAs with higher a but lower s, the net effect on health output is ambiguous. Finally,
substituting realised health output into the utility function gives indirect utility U∗(a, s,M) ≡
U(a, s, e∗(a, s),M) = sH∗(a, s)− d(e∗(a, s)) +M , with U∗a > 0, U∗s > 0, and U∗M > 0.
3.2 Stage 2: Panel’s Choice of Applicants
In Stage 2, the panel observes applicants with different ability and prosociality. By conducting
interviews, and using background information (such as O-level scores), the panel is able to observe
these with some noise, so for individual i the panel observes a˜i = ai+ ǫai and s˜i = si+ ǫsi, where ǫi
is individual-specific noise. For simplicity, we abstract from the exact optimization problem and,
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as both effort and health output are increasing in a and s, simply assume that the panel follows
some rule that picks candidates with high levels of a˜, s˜, or both. Even aside from the direct effect
of s on effort and thus health output, we shall see below that ability and prosociality are positively
correlated among the applicants with high ability and thus the panel may also take s into account
as a secondary signal to improve prediction of a.
3.3 Stage 1: Applicant’s Decision to Apply
In Stage 1, applicants decide whether or not to apply. If hired, an individual with traits (ai, si) will
receive utility in Stage 3 of
U∗(ai, si,M)
To apply, an individual needs to pay cost c and whether she is hired depends on how her ability
and prosociality compare to those of the other applicants. As the panel observes these with noise,
an individual applicant i can have a non-zero probability of being selected even if they do not
have the highest levels of ai and si, and thus we can observe applicants with a range of ai and
si in equilibrium. In addition, the probability of selection for any applicant i will also depend on
the total number of applicants (as the number of CHA positions is fixed), which is an equilibrium
quantity that will depend on M . We thus write the equilibrium probability as p(ai, si,M), where
the panel’s decision rule means that p is increasing and concave in both a and s.14 We shall see later
that p is decreasing inM . Taking into account the probability of selection in Stage 2 and the utility
in Stage 3 if selected, individual i will apply if the expected utility of applying to be a CHA net of
application costs exceeds the utility in their next best alternative occupation, which, in this setting,
is mostly self-employment in agriculture or small trade where the agent is the residual claimant.
We denote this by V (a) and assume, as is standard, that the marginal return to ability is higher
in the private sector Va > U
∗
a > 0 for every a. This is the empirically relevant case because, as is
common in the public sector, CHAs’ earnings are not linked to performance, while self-employed
agents in the private sector are the residual claimants on the value they create.15 Thus, individual
i applies if and only if E(ai, si,M) = p(ai, si,M)U
∗(ai, si,M) − c > V (ai). To capture the fact
that in practice there are minimum qualification requirements, we assume that application costs
are high enough that E(0, s,M) < V (0) for any s and M , so that low-ability individuals who have
little chance of being hired do not apply. Formally, there is a threshold of ability ai(si,M) such
that all i with ai < ai(si,M) do not apply. We shall suppress the subscript on the threshold,
but it is important to note that it differs across individuals as it depends on their level of si. The
Appendix shows that the structure of the solution depends on whether E(ai, si,M) > V (ai) for
14We assume continuity of this and related equilibrium quantities (i.e. that there are sufficiently many applicants)
for analytical simplicity, although this is clearly not literally true.
15Young (2012) runs Mincerian regressions for 24 countries (including Zambia), of which 14 are in sub-Saharan
Africa, using a range of methods that yields estimates of returns to education of between 9.5% and 11.6%. His
preferred estimate, used in the remainder of his paper, is 11.6%. The estimates are qualitatively unchanged when
restricting the sample to Zambia only (results available upon request).
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all ai > a. If so, everybody with ai > a will apply. If not, there is a further threshold defined by
E(ai, si,M) = V (a¯i) such that only i with a < ai < a apply.
3.4 Stage 0: Treatment
The intervention takes place at Stage 0 when treatment districts receive the career posters and
control districts do not. We model treatment as MT > MC representing the fact that the career
emphasis suggests a higher expected net present value of lifetime material benefits despite the
starting wage being the same. Our goal is to make precise the conditions under which treatment
creates a trade-off by attracting applicants with lower prosociality and higher ability.
Treatment increases U∗ through several channels. Of these, the increase in the net present value
of exogenous material benefits M is the one that makes the job relatively more attractive to indi-
viduals with low prosociality.16 This may occur through automatic salary progression (individuals
are entitled to all increases negotiated collectively for government employees) or through promotion
to higher-paying positions.
To create a trade-off between ability and prosociality, the increase in M must attract higher-
ability applicants. This happens through the upper threshold of ability, a(si,M). In particular, as
Result 1 below shows, the threshold a(si,M) is increasing in M . This also creates an additional
effect in equilibrium, as the fact that more (high-ability) candidates apply reduces the probability
of being selected for all applicants. This means that dp
dM
< 0. This effect is weaker for candidates
with high levels of a, that is d
2p
dMda
> 0, regardless of whether they apply, because they are highly
likely to be selected. The fact that M affects the probability of being selected as described above
creates two offsetting effects on the lower threshold. On the one hand, higher material benefits
increase U∗ directly and thus lower a(s,M); on the other hand, the reduction in probability arising
from more applicants discourages applying and thus raises a(s,M). Combining these effects yields:
Result 1: Increasing material benefits M will attract higher-ability applicants who would not
apply otherwise ( ∂a
∂M
> 0) and either (i) lower the ability of the lowest-ranked applicant ( ∂a
∂M
< 0)
and increase the total number of applicants or (ii) discourage low-ability applicants ( ∂a
∂M
> 0) and
have an ambiguous impact on the total number.
To assess the effect on prosociality we note that U∗ is increasing in both a and s. The threshold
a(si,M) is increasing in s because, due to the fact that Va > U
∗
a > 0, higher-ability individuals
need to have a high level of prosociality to meet their participation constraint. Symmetrically, the
threshold a(si,M) is decreasing in s because more prosocial applicants have a higher expected payoff
for the same probability of being chosen, thus the probability, and hence the level of ability, that
makes them indifferent between applying and not is lower. This implies that talent and prosociality
16Treatment can affect U∗ in several ways that do not create trade-offs, for instance by increasing the marginal
product of ability. This is due to career benefits giving high-ability individuals the chance to be promoted to higher-
ranked positions where they can benefit more people or have more influence on key decisions. This appeals to high
a individuals who can benefit from it and high s individuals who care about it. In this respect, treatment improves
the quality of the applicant pool in all dimensions without creating a trade-off.
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are positively (negatively) correlated among the highest- (lowest-) ability applicants, even though
they are not correlated in the population. Therefore we have:
Result 2: Under any M, the most able applicant is also the most prosocial. An increase in
M leaves the prosociality of the marginal applicant unchanged and has an ambiguous effect on the
prosociality of the average applicant.
Figure 2 illustrates treatment effects on ability and prosociality. There are many possible
ways of modelling these functions. We make the starkest possible assumption and set Hae = 0,
meaning that prosociality increases the marginal return to effort, while ability increases output
directly and does not affect effort. Thus, all else equal, more prosocial people will work hard, while
more able people work less hard but produce more output. We consider a simple example where
H = 2
√
ξe+ a, where ξ > 0 is a parameter, and d(e) = e2, which implies e∗ =
√
ξs, H∗ = 2ξs+ a,
and U∗ = ξs2 + as + M . The probability of selection must satisfy the following: (i) increasing
in a and s, (ii) decreasing in M, and (iii) ∂
2p
∂a∂M
> 0. For the illustration we use the following
functional form p(a, s,M) = γas
β+µ(MT−M)
1+µ(MT−M)
, where γ > 0 is set to guarantee that p ∈ [0, 1],17
β > 0 captures the weight that the panel puts on prosociality, and µ > 0 scales the decrease in
probability that arises from more (high-ability) people applying in equilibrium when M rises.18
Note that dp
dM
= − µ(1−p)1+µ(MT−M) → 0 as p(a, s,M) → 1, which says that the increased applicant
effect is zero for candidates who are certain to be selected. We set V = va2 + a, where we assume
v > γ which ensures that Va > U
∗
a > 0 everywhere and that Va > Ea > 0 for all a sufficiently large.
In Figure 2a, we see that, at low levels of a, the cost of applying is too high; for sufficiently high
levels of a, the increased return to ability in the private sector begins to dominate, thus defining
a¯(s,M). Figure 2b illustrates the application frontier, that is all the combinations of a and s such
that an individual is indifferent between applying and not. The frontier is positively sloped, so that
the ability threshold is higher for more prosocial applicants and all individuals below the frontier
will apply. Note that the main results are robust to many functional form assumptions so long as
they generate a¯(s,M) as upward sloping. The dashed line shows that an increase in M shifts the
frontier upward. The effect on average prosociality depends on the balance of two forces, which can
be seen in Figure 2c. First, the average prosociality of individuals whose a is high enough that they
apply only with career benefits is higher than the average prosociality of those who apply without.
In the Figure, these individuals must have s > sˆ. Intuitively, candidates with high ability that are
attracted by treatment must have very high prosociality in order for them to prefer the CHA role
to the private sector. Second, the average prosociality of individuals whose a is low enough that
they apply without career benefits is lower when these are offered. This is because U∗ is increasing
in M ; thus for any a the level of s that makes individuals indifferent between applying or not falls.
In the Figure, we see this through the fact that the dashed line is always to the left of the thick
line. This is the standard substitution or crowding out effect.
17For ease of interpretation, note that p = 1 when γasβ = 1.
18In principle, some M¯ > MT would be more suitable in the function for general usage, but for our purposes MT
is sufficient and helps to avoid unnecessary proliferation of parameters.
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Given that the effect on the infra-marginal and marginal applicants differ, the treatment effect
on hired CHAs depends on the selection mechanism. Mechanisms that pick the highest-ability
candidates from the applicant pool will produce the largest possible positive difference in ability
and no difference in prosociality because the most able applicants within each pool are also the most
prosocial. Mechanisms that pick randomly from the pool will still produce a positive difference in
ability and a negative difference in prosociality if the average applicant under career incentives is
less prosocial. Thus, to understand how differences in the applicant pool translate into differences
among hired CHAs we need to understand the selection mechanism. This is the aim of the next
section.
4 Treatment Effect on the Applicant Pool and Selected Candi-
dates
4.1 Treatment Effect on the Applicant Pool
The recruitment drive yielded 2,457 applications, an average of 7.4 applicants for each position.
Overall, 1,804 (73.4%) applicants met the eligibility requirements and were invited for interviews;19
of these, 1,585 (87.9%), or 4.7 per position, reported on their interview day when we administered
a questionnaire to collect information on skills, career ambition, and prosociality. These 1,585 form
the applicant pool we analyze in this section.
To measure treatment effects on the composition of the applicant pool we collect measures of
ability and prosociality at the application stage for the universe of applicants who were interviewed.
To measure cognitive skills we use grade 12 scores in the final exam and the number of courses
taken in biology and other natural sciences. These are the skills measures used as application
requirements. For non-cognitive skills we focus on career ambition, measured by asking applicants
the job they envisage doing in five years’ time, and code as career-motivated those who aim to a
higher-ranked position in the Ministry. To measure prosociality we combine the applicant’s self
reported willingness to stay in the community in the long term together with the “Inclusion of
Others in Self (IOS)” scale that measures alignment of interests (Aron and Others 2004).20 We
do so to identify those who want to stay in the community because they care about community
outcomes, as opposed to those who stay for other reasons.
Guided by the framework, we estimate the effect of treatment on skills and prosociality, both
on the average applicant and as a function of skill rank. Table 1 shows that treatment attracts
19All completed application forms were taken to the district Ministry of Health office where district health officials
checked that requirements were met. No discretion was given at this stage; applicants who did not meet the objective
criteria were rejected, and those who did were invited for interviews.
20IOS measures the extent to which individuals perceive community and self-interest as overlapping. Applicants
are asked to choose between four pictures, each showing two circles (labeled “self” and “community”) with varying
degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely overlapping. This variable equals 1 if the respondent
chooses the almost completely overlapping picture, 0 otherwise. IOS has been validated across a wide variety of
contexts, and adapted versions are found to be strongly correlated with environmental behavior (Schultz 2012) and
connectedness to the community (Mashek et al. 2007).
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individuals with higher cognitive skills and career motivation. The average effects are about one-
fifth of a standard deviation in the control group and are all precisely estimated at the 5% confidence
level or above. Both here, and throughout the paper, we also report p-values based on the effective
degrees of freedom (EDF) correction procedure in Young (2016) and a randomization inference
procedure (Young 2019).21 Average prosociality is lower, albeit not precisely estimated, while age,
gender, and current occupation are very similar. The latter is due to the fact that, in line with the
evidence from the Census in Table A.1, there is hardly any variation. Most applicants (70%) are
farmers, a further 9% are housewives, 6% are traders, and 5% are teachers. Finally, the number
of applicants per health post is not significantly different. Result 1 makes precise that this can
happen if treatment increases both ability thresholds. To test this, Figure 3, Panels A and B
report the kernel density estimate as well as the quantile treatment effects on total test scores.
Both reveal a rightward shift, namely, all applicants in treatment, from the lowest- to the highest-
ranked, have higher test scores. Panels C and D present the mean levels of ability and prosociality
in treatment and control across different levels of the applicant’s skill rank in his or her health
post, with confidence intervals based on a regression with standard errors clustered at the district
level. Rank is based on final exam scores, within community. In line with Panels A and B, Panel
C shows that the treatment group’s exam scores are higher at every rank. Most importantly, in
line with the theoretical framework, the difference in prosociality is zero for top-ranked applicants
and negative for lower-ranked applicants.
The results in Figure 3 are in line with the simple theoretical framework: ability increases
throughout whereas the effect on prosociality is zero for top-ranked candidates and negative for
lower-ranked candidates. The figure makes clear that the effect of treatment on CHAs themselves
will depend on how these are chosen among the applicants. We analyze this next.
4.2 The Selection Mechanism and Treatment Effect on Selected Candidates
Selection panels are in charge of choosing the two candidates that will serve as CHAs in the
health post. Panels have five members: the district health official, a representative from the health
post’s associated health center, and three members of the local neighborhood health committee.
Each panel was asked to nominate two top candidates and up to three reserves. The Government
explicitly stated a preference for women and for those who had previously worked as community
health workers, but the ultimate choice was left to the panels. Overall, selection panels nominated
334 applicants as “top 2” candidates and 413 as reserves.22
To understand how differences in the applicant pool translate into differences in hired CHAs we
analyze how panels select candidates. This analysis also sheds light on whether treatment affects
21Specifically, we use the randomized randomization-t p-value, computed using randcmd in STATA with 10,000
iterations.
22The nominations were reviewed centrally by the Government of Zambia, and 334 final candidates were invited
to join a yearlong training course. Of these, 314 applicants accepted the invitation and, in June 2011, moved to the
training school in Ndola, Zambia’s second-largest city. Of the applicants who joined the program, 307 graduated and
started working in August 2012. All the health workers were deployed back to their communities of origin.
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panels’ choices and on which traits panel members deem important for the job. Table 2 estimates
the probability that candidate i in health post h is chosen as follows:
sih =
∑
j∈J
αTj ChX
j
i +
∑
j∈J
αCj (1− Ch)Xji + γNh + ζih
where sih = 1 if i is one of the two nominated candidates and 0 otherwise. Ch equals 1 if health
post h is in treatment and 0 if it is in the control group. Xji are indicator variables that equal 1 if
candidate i is in the top three of trait j, and the core set J includes skills, ambition, and prosociality.
We also report regressions with an expanded set that includes social connections to local political
leaders to test whether connections help with getting the job when material benefits are higher.
To control for the strength of competition, we include the number of interviewed candidates in the
same health post Nh. We control for the stratification variables and cluster standard errors at the
district level, correcting for effective degrees of freedom using the procedure in Young (2016).
The coefficients of interest are αTj and α
C
j , which measure the weight given to trait j in the
treatment and control groups, respectively. We test the null that panels use the same criteria in
both groups, that is αTj = α
C
j . Panels are exposed to treatment as they see the posters, but
in contrast to candidates, for whom the poster is the only source of information, panel members
know the job attributes and who would be suitable for it. The two more senior panel members—the
district health official and the health center representative—are employees of the Ministry of Health,
and hence are familiar with career progression rules regardless of treatment. Thus this is likely not
as powerful, or perhaps entirely moot.23 Table 2 reports the estimates of αTj and α
C
j for all j ∈ J
and the p-value of the test of equality.
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that panels put a strong positive weight on skills and prosociality and
do so equally in both treatment and control groups. The average probability of being nominated for
an applicant who does not rank at the top of the skills and prosociality distributions and who has no
career ambition is 0.09. This increases by 12pp for applicants at the top of the skill distribution, by
7 to 10pp for applicants with career ambitions, and by 6 to 9pp for applicants with high prosociality.
The tests of equality of coefficints between treatment and control do not reject the null for any of
these traits. Column 3 additionally shows that connections either to political leaders or to staff at
the health facility do not affect the probability of selection in either treatment or control.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that career opportunities attract applicants who have
different skills, career motivation, and prosociality and that all panels deem these traits to be
valuable and are more likely to choose applicants who rank highly in all three.
Our conceptual framework makes clear that, compared to a random selection mechanism, this
type of selection leads to higher skill differences and eliminates prosociality differences. To illustrate,
we compare the traits of the CHAs selected by panels to 1000 random draws of two CHAs from
each health post’s applicant pool. Table 3 reports the average trait for panel-selected CHAs and
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the same traits when candidates are chosen randomly. The
23Further analysis, available upon request, shows that treatment does not affect panel composition.
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table shows that the distribution of skills and motivation in treatment is to the right of control, and
that panels choose from the top in both groups. This implies that, compared to random selection,
panels select CHAs who have higher exam scores and career motivation. Indeed, panel-selected
CHAs score higher than the 90th percentile of randomly selected CHAs on all three measures.
Despite the fact that panels put the same weight on talent and career motivation in treatment and
control, the average skill and career motivation of selected CHAs is higher in the treatment group
because treatment attracts candidates who do not apply in control.
In contrast, whereas randomly selected CHAs have lower prosociality in the treatment group,
panel selection undoes this difference because, as shown in Figure 3, the most talented applicants
in each pool have the same level of prosociality, and panels select these. The fact that treatment
creates a trade-off between ability and prosociality for low-ability applicants is of no consequence
because these are not hired.
5 Inputs in Service Delivery
5.1 Measuring Inputs in Service Delivery
The health workers’ main task, to which they are required to devote 80% of their time, or 4 out of
5 days per week, is to visit households. The input part of our analysis focuses on the number of
visits completed over the course of 18 months, from August 2012 (when the health workers started
work) until January 2014. The number of household visits is akin to an attendance measure for
teachers or nurses: the health workers are supposed to work in people’s houses, and we measure how
often they are there. Naturally, differences in the number of visits can be compensated for with
differences in other inputs; we discuss this possibility in Section 5.3 after establishing the main
results. Furthermore, differences in inputs ultimately are of interest only if they lead to better
outcomes, which we will discuss in Section 6.
Our primary measure of household visits is built by aggregating information on each visit from
individual receipts. All the health workers are required to carry receipt books and issue each
household a receipt for each visit, which the households are asked to sign. The health workers
are required to keep the book with the copies of the receipts to send to the Government when
completed. They are also required to send all information on these receipts—consisting of the
date, time, and duration of the visit, as well as the client’s phone number—via text message to the
Ministry of Health. These text messages are collected in a central data-processing facility, which
we manage.
Since visits are measured by aggregating text messages sent by the health workers themselves,
identification can be compromised by the presence of measurement error that is correlated with
treatment. For instance, health workers in the career treatment might put more effort in reporting
visits via text messages or might report visits that never took place, leading to a positive bias in
the estimated treatment effect.
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We validate our visits measure by comparing it to administrative data and households’ own
reports of health worker activity. The administrative data is drawn from the Health Management
and Information System (HMIS), which is the Ministry of Health’s system for collecting routine
health services data at government facilities. These are reported at the end of each month and
sent electronically to the Ministry via a mobile platform, jointly by the two CHAs and the other
staff working in each health post. As HMIS data are only available aggregated at the health post
level (summed over the two workers in each health post) we regress these on our visit measure, also
aggregated at the health post level. Columns 1 and 2 in Table A.3 show that the two measures are
strongly correlated (r=0.767). The correlation in this measure is higher in the treatment group than
the control group (0.836 vs. 0.644), although the difference is not significant, which contradicts the
differential reporting hypothesis.
The households’ reports are collected via a survey that we administered to 16 randomly chosen
households in each of 47 randomly selected communities chosen from the set of communities where
the health workers operate, stratified by district. We ask respondents whether they know each of
the health workers (97% do), whether they have ever been visited (44% of them have), and their
level of satisfaction with each health worker. Columns 3-4 show a precisely estimated correlation
between our visit measure and the probability that a household reports a visit. This correlation
is slightly higher in the treatment group than the control group, although the difference is not
significant. Columns 5-6 show a precisely estimated correlation between our visit measure and
the household’s reported level of satisfaction with the health worker’s performance. The difference
between treatment and control group is small and insignificant, casting doubt on the relevance of
differential reporting.
Taken together, the findings in Table A.3 generally validate our visits measure. Ultimately,
however, we will not be able to detect a treatment effect on households’ health outcomes in Section
6 if measured differences in visits capture differences in reporting rather than in actual visits.
5.2 Treatment Effect on Household Visits
Table 4 reports the reduced form effects of treatment on performance–that is, the estimates of:
vihdp = α+ βCid + Zhγ + δEd + ρp + ǫihdp (5.1)
where vihdp is the number of visits completed by health worker i in catchment area h, district d,
and province p. Cid equals 1 if agent i is recruited and operates in a district assigned to the career
opportunities treatment. Zh is a vector of area characteristics, which includes the number of staff at
the health post, cell network coverage, and the distribution of households between farms and villages
described in Table A.1, although we note that the results are qualitatively unchanged if we remove
these. We control for the stratification variables, district-level high school graduation rate Ed, and
province indicators ρp throughout. Standard errors are clustered at the level of randomization, the
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district, and, as mentioned before, we also report p-values from the effective degrees of freedom
correction in Young (2016) and a randomization inference procedure (Young 2019).
The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of making career opportunities salient
at the recruitment stage on the number of visits completed over 18 months. Considering that all
the health workers are given the same information on career opportunities during the year-long
training, β captures the effect of career opportunities on performance through selection. Recall
that selection can affect performance by increasing productivity for a given level of effort or by
increasing the marginal return to effort. An example of the former is talent for logistics: for the
same amount of effort, a more talented health worker plans better and reaches more households in
the same amount of time. An example of the latter is the utility weight put on career advancement:
health workers who value career more draw a higher marginal benefit from a given unit of effort
and therefore exert more effort.
The causal effect of career opportunities on performance can be identified under the assumptions
that (i) Cid is orthogonal to ǫihdp, and (ii) there are no spillovers between the two groups. Orthog-
onality is obtained via random assignment. Spillovers via movements of health workers between
treatment and control areas are ruled out by the program requirement that health workers must
have been residing in the community they want to work in prior to applying. This implies that
career opportunities cannot draw in talent from control areas. Spillovers of information, caused for
example by potential applicants in control seeing the treatment poster, would introduce a down-
ward bias because they would reduce the information differences between treatment and control.
Information spillovers are minimized by design, as recruitment messages were randomized at the
district level—which, given the travel distance between rural communities in different districts,
makes it very unlikely that applicants in one group might have seen the poster assigned to the
other group. Importantly, information cannot accidentally spillover through the district officials
that implement the program or through the recruitment panels, as these are only exposed to one
treatment.
Column 1 of Table 4 reveals a large and precisely estimated effect of career opportunities on
household visits: health workers recruited by making career opportunities salient do 94 more visits
(29% more than control) over the course of 18 months. The median treatment effect is 104.4
(bootstrapped s.e. 43.9), which allays the concern that the average effect is driven by outliers. The
magnitude of the difference is economically meaningful: if each of the 147 health workers in control
had done as many visits as their counterparts in the career treatment, 13,818 more households
would have been visited over the 18-month period. Given that for most of these households, health
workers are the only providers of health services, the difference between treatments is likely to have
implications for health outputs in these communities. We return to this issue in Section 6.
Columns 2-4 divide the 18-month period into three and show that the estimated treatment
effect is identical in the three semesters. This casts doubt on the alternative hypothesis that agents
in the two groups have the same traits, but agents in the treatment group perceive stronger career
incentives because they have known about them for longer (about 2 years vs. 1 year for the control
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group). Such a difference should wane with time, while the difference due to stable traits should
be stable.24
To shed light on what treatment health workers do differently, we administer a time use survey
to all health workers after they have started working. The findings, reported in detail in the
Appendix, indicate that treatment and control health workers work similar hours and allocate
their time similarly across similar activities. This indicates that treatment health workers are more
efficient at their jobs. Household visits take place in remote, low-density areas: the median 78
square km area has 200 households, with an interquartile range of 130 to 360. It is thus rather
time-consuming to go from house to house, and this is compounded by the fact that roads are
bad. In this setting, the ability to plan—e.g., by making appointments with specific households
or collecting information as to whether members are likely to be home before setting out to visit
them—is an important determinant of completing visits successfully. Our model was agnostic as to
whether effort and ability are complementary, i.e., as to whether higher ability, for a given level of
prosociality, increases output directly only or also through increased effort. Given that these two
groups have similar levels of prosociality but different levels of ability, these findings, suggestive of
similar effort levels, appear more consistent with the version in which they are not complementary.
To conclude we establish the extent to which differences in performance are due to selection
on observables. We search for the vector of observables that explains the largest possible share
of variation of performance in the control group and use the estimated coefficients to predict
performance in the treatment group.25 This yields the predicted difference between treatment and
control on the basis of the observables that best predict performance. The best predictors explain
31% of the observed variation in control and the predicted difference between treatment and control
is 44 visits. Given that the actual, unconditional performance gap is 101, differences in observables
explain 44% of it. The remaining 56% is due to traits we do not measure.
The finding that observables have limited power in explaining performance differences echoes
the well-established finding that differences in teachers’ effectiveness are large and only weakly
correlated with observable traits. It is also consistent with other settings where agents self-select,
such as in applying for welfare programs (Alatas et al. n.d.) or purchasing health products (Ashraf
et al. 2010). In those settings, like in ours, self-selection cannot be mimicked by targeting on
observable traits.
24The fact that the treatment effect is stable also casts doubt on the event that it is driven by a negative “surprise”
for agents in the control group (i.e., their effort response to finding out about career opportunities is negative and
larger—in absolute value—than what it would have been had they known the career opportunities at the outset).
In addition, if there really were a substantial intrinsic crowd-out of this kind, we would likely expect at least some
greater attrition in the control group as participation constraints that were met ex ante would not be met ex post
- yet, as discussed later, we find that attrition is neither economically nor significantly different between treatment
and control. Nonetheless, it remains possible that intrinsic crowd-out may be contributing to the results if the effects
do not fade with time and do not lead to dropping out.
25Specifically, we select the five best predictors, in addition to our stratification variables, using the Furnival-
Wilson branch and bound algorithm (implemented using vselect in STATA) in the control group. We then use these
to predict the mean number of visits in both treatment and control, and calculate the difference in these predicted
means.
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5.3 Beyond Number of Visits: Compensation Mechanisms and Other Activities
Table 5 investigates the hypothesis that health workers in the control group take other actions
that compensate for the lower number of visits. Column 1 tests whether control health workers
are more likely to be retained while career health workers leave with their newly acquired skills
as soon as it is feasible to do so. Since the health workers are bonded to their position for one
year,26 we measure retention by the number of health workers who make at least one visit after the
one-year commitment has elapsed. We find that, by this measure, 18% of health workers drop out,
though some of this may be due to a combination of malfunctioning phones and the rainy season
(falling between months 15-18 in our analysis window), making travel to cell network-accessible
areas difficult. This attrition rate is balanced across treatments. It is important to note that
according to the Ministry’s rule, health workers have to wait two years before applying for higher-
ranked positions, such that none of those who left their positions did so for career progression. It
is possible that career opportunities will affect retention rates after the two-year mark. Whether
this entails a welfare cost depends on whether the workers can be easily replaced and whether the
Government can use their skills in other jobs. In our context, replacement is straightforward; the
number of applicants per post was above seven, and the government faces scarcity of health staff
at all levels, such that promoting high-performing health workers to nursing and other higher-level
cadres is likely to be welfare-improving.
The number of visits can hide heterogeneity on a variety of dimensions that can make the
health workers less effective in generating health outcomes, such as doing shorter visits, targeting
the head of household rather than women and children, or targeting easier-to-reach households.
We provide evidence that career health workers do not do worse on any of these dimensions. They
devote the same time to a single visit (column 2), and are equally likely to target their primary
clients—women and children (column 3). They also reach more households (column 4) and make
more follow-up visits (column 5). The point estimates indicate that just over one-third (36/94) of
the total treatment effect is due to career health workers visiting more households, and two-thirds
to them visiting the same household more than once. This is consistent with the two groups of
health workers having a similar number of households in their catchment area and visiting them
at least once, but treatment health workers doing more follow-up visits. Note that follow-ups are
considered an integral part of the health worker job, in view of which Ministry of Health guidelines
state health workers should attempt to visit each household on a quarterly basis. Finally, Table A.5
shows that treatment health workers allocate their time in a similar way to control health workers
during household visits. This allays the concern that health workers who see themselves as health
professionals neglect “soft” tasks like counseling.
Besides household visits, the health workers are expected to assist staff at the health post by
seeing patients, assisting with antenatal care, and maintaining the facility. They are also supposed
26The health workers were told that if they quit before one year of service, they would be required to pay monthly
wages for any months not worked (rather than simply relinquishing pay) to compensate the Government for the free
one-year training that they received.
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to organize community meetings such as health education talks at the health post and in schools.
Columns 6-7 investigate whether differences in household visits are compensated by differences in
secondary tasks using HMIS data on the number of community meetings health workers organize
and the number of patients they attend to at the health post. The latter should be seen as a proxy
of the quantity of services delivered by the health workers at the health post, as seeing patients is
mostly a nurse’s job. We find that health workers recruited by making career opportunities salient
organize twice as many meetings over 18 months, and the difference is precisely estimated. The
effect of career opportunities on the number of patients the health workers see at the health post
is also positive, but small and not precisely estimated.
6 Facility Utilization, Health Practices, and Health Outcomes
The program leads to a substantial increase in the number of health staff operating in the commu-
nities where the health workers are deployed: the number of staff associated with the community
health post increases on average from 1.5 to 3.5. Given the size of the increase and the magnitude
of the treatment effect on household visits and community mobilization meetings, it is reasonable to
expect treatment to affect health outcomes in these communities. The health workers can directly
affect facility utilization and health practices by increasing both demand, e.g., by providing infor-
mation and promoting behavioral changes, and supply, e.g., by helping cover staff shortages at the
health post or delivering medical treatments to households. In turn, improved facility utilization
and practices should lead to better outcomes.
Besides their intrinsic importance for the welfare of these communities, treatment effects on
facility utilization and household outcomes allow us to shed light on whether health workers in
the control group perform better on dimensions we cannot observe enough to improve outcomes.
For instance, treatment health workers could target households that are more interested in health
services and would use facilities when necessary anyway, while control health workers could target
households that they need to persuade to change behavior, and that require more work, leading
to fewer visits overall. If this were true, treatment would be uncorrelated (or even negatively
correlated) with facility utilization and health outcomes.
To provide evidence on whether treatment affected facility utilization, we use data from the
Ministry’s HMIS administrative records; to measure effects on health practices and outcomes, we
survey households residing in the communities where the health workers operate. As the main
remit of the health worker job is maternal and child health, we focus on this throughout.
6.1 Treatment Effect on Facility Utilization
The Ministry’s HMIS administrative records are compiled by facilities’ senior staff and transmitted
to the Ministry of Health via an electronic platform. Two levels of facilities serve these communities:
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health centers and health posts.27 The health workers are supposed to encourage women to give
birth at the closest health center and to bring in children for regular visits and immunizations at
the closest facility (health center or health post). The importance of institutional deliveries in this
context cannot be understated: Zambia’s maternal mortality rates are very high and health centers
have the equipment and medical supplies that can prevent these deaths. Regular children’s visits
ensure that conditions such as diarrhea are treated before they become dangerous. Immunizations
protect children from potentially fatal illnesses.
To test whether the treatment affected facility utilization, we obtain information on institutional
deliveries, children’s visits, and immunizations for the period January 2011-June 2014 and estimate
the following specification:
yhdpt = α+ βChd + γAt + δChd ∗At + Zhθ + Edφ+ ρp + ξhdpt
where yhdpt is the outcome in health facility h in district d and province p at quarter t.
28
h represents the lowest level of government facility to which the health workers can refer their
patients. This is the health post if operational or the closest health center otherwise. The only
exception is childbirths, which are always measured at the health center level, as that is where they
are supposed to take place. Chd=1 if facility h is located in a district randomly assigned to the
career treatment. We have data for 14 quarters, equally divided before and after the health workers’
arrival, and At=1 after the health workers’ arrival (4th quarter of 2012). To minimize composition
bias and to test for robustness to facility fixed effect models, we restrict the sample to the facilities
for which we have at least three observations before and after the health workers’ arrival.29 Zh is
a vector of area characteristics, which includes the number of staff at the health post, cell network
coverage, and the distribution of households between farms and villages described in Table A.1. We
control for the stratification variables, district-level high school graduation rate Ed, and province
indicators ρp throughout. Standard errors are clustered at the level of randomization, the district,
and, as mentioned before, we also report p-values from the effective degrees of freedom correction
in Young (2016) and a randomization inference procedure (Young 2019).
The parameter of interest is δ, the difference-in-differences between facilities in treatment and
control districts before and after the health workers’ arrival. Under the parallel trend assumption,
δ captures the effect of career opportunities for health workers on these outputs.
Table 6 shows that, indeed, career opportunities improve clinic utilization outputs. In particular,
the number of women giving birth at a health center increases by 30% relative to the mean in
27Health facilities in Zambia are structured according to a population-based hierarchy. Health posts are the first-
level health facility for most rural communities and provide basic medical care (no inpatient or surgical services).
Health centers, which typically serve a population encompassing four to five health posts, provide both outpatient and
inpatient services, including labor and delivery and minor surgical procedures. District hospitals in turn encompass
several health center catchment areas and are primarily focused on inpatient care.
28HMIS data should be transmitted to MoH monthly, but in practice (due to poor connectivity), reports are
missing for some months and the information added to the following month. We aggregate the data at the quarterly
level to smooth out monthly fluctuations due to this.
29This restriction keeps an average of 76% of the health posts and 71% of the health centers in the sample.
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control areas at baseline. The effect on institutional deliveries is thus the same order of magnitude
as the effect of performance pay for clinics as evaluated in Rwanda (23%; Basinga et al. 2011) and
Cambodia (25%; de Poel et al. 2014). Selection and incentive effects of similar magnitudes (22%
each) are also found in the only firm study that identifies the two separately (Lazear 2000).
Table 6 also shows that the number of children under age five visited increases by 24%, the
number of children under 5 weighed increases by 22%, and the number of children under 12 months
of age receiving polio vaccination increases by 20%. The effects on postnatal visits for women
and BCG and measles vaccinations are also positive and in the 8-22% magnitude range, but are
not precisely estimated. The average standardized treatment effect (Kling et al. 2007) over all
outcomes is 0.278, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Reassuringly, there are no
significant differences between treatment and control in any of these outcomes before the health
workers’ arrival: all the estimated β coefficients are small and not significantly different from zero.
To provide support to our identifying assumption, in Table A.6 (Panel A) we run a placebo test
where we split the pre-health worker period in two halves and test whether outcomes improve in
treatment areas over time even in the absence of the health workers. Reassuringly, they do not.
Finally, Table A.6 (Panel B) estimates (2) with facility fixed effects; the fact that all estimated
δ coefficients remain stable provides evidence that they are not biased by time-invariant facility
unobservables correlated with treatment.
6.2 Treatment Effect on Health Practices and Outcomes
To provide evidence on the effect of treatment on health practices and outcomes, we survey house-
holds in 47 randomly chosen communities located in each of the 47 districts where the health workers
operate.30 We randomly choose 16 households in each community, surveying 738 in total.31 These
surveys are administered by a team of enumerators who are trained by us and unconnected to the
health workers or the Ministry of Health. As the main focus of the health worker job is maternal
and child health, we only survey households that contain at least one child under five. The sur-
vey contains modules on health and sanitation knowledge, health practices, incidence of illnesses,
and anthropometrics for the youngest child. Knowledge, practices, and illnesses are self-reported;
deworming and immunization data are drawn from the child health card, and anthropometrics are
measured by trained enumerators. We interview the main carer of the child, which is their mother
in 90% of the cases and either a grandparent or a sibling in the remaining 10%. All questions are
drawn from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Zambia questionnaire, with the exception
30Although 48 districts were randomized, one district did not participate in the recruitment process or submit
nominations for CHA candidates, and hence was excluded from the survey sample.
31The sample frame had 752 households but we interviewed 738. The missing households are evenly spread across
communities as the number of households surveyed in a community varies between 13 and 16. The difference is due
to several factors. In some communities, safety concerns related to local political tensions forced the survey team to
leave the community before completing surveying. In other communities, especially low-density communities where
travel times between households could exceed one hour, the survey team was unable to find a sufficient number of
eligible households within the allotted survey time. One household interview was lost due to malfunction of the
mobile device on which the interview was recorded.
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of the health knowledge module, which we designed based on the health worker curriculum, and
mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC), which the DHS does not measure.
Table 7 reports the estimates of:
yidp = α+ βCid +Diγ + δEd + ρp + ǫidp (6.1)
where yidp is the outcome of child (or respondent) i in district d and province p. Cid equals 1 if
child (or respondent) i lives in a district that is assigned to the career opportunities treatment. Di
is a vector of child, respondent, and household characteristics that includes child age and gender,
household size and number of assets, and the education level of the respondent. As above, we
control for the stratification variables, district-level high school graduation rate Ed and province
indicators ρp throughout, and cluster standard errors at the district level, with additional p-values
reported based on the effective degrees of freedom correction procedure in Young (2016) and a
randomization inference procedure (Young 2019).
Column 1 shows that the average respondent answers 74% of the knowledge questions correctly
and that this does not differ by treatment status. In contrast, treatment affects all the health
practices we collect information on. In particular, Columns 2 and 3 show that children under 2
living in treatment areas are 5pp more likely to be breastfed,32 and their stools are 12pp more
likely to be safely disposed; these effects represent an 8% and 20% increase from the control group
mean, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show that treatment also increases the number of deworming
treatments by 16% and the likelihood that the child is on track with the immunization schedule
by 4.7pp, which is 81% of the control group mean (5.8%).33 Importantly, the treatment affects
the incidence of immunizations for children who are young enough to have been exposed to the
health workers when their immunization period started (as shown in Column 5), but not for those
who were too old to start the cycle when the health workers started working (coefficient -0.014,
standard error 0.022). This echoes the findings in Table 6 that show no difference in immunization
rates between treatment and control areas before the health workers started working.
Columns 6-8 measure treatment effects on the incidence of three main illness symptoms: fever,
diarrhea, and cough. These are fairly common, as 47%, 26%, and 45% of children in control
areas had experienced them, respectively, in the past two weeks. As it is widely acknowledged,
self-reported symptoms can actually worsen as knowledge improves and individuals learn how to
recognize them, so these effects are lower bounds. We find that treatment reduces the incidence of
cough symptoms by 7pp while leaving the others unchanged. Finally, Columns 9-13 show treatment
effects on anthropometric measurements. We report weight-for-age z-scores and mid-upper arm
circumference (MUAC). The combination of these two allows us to measure both chronic and acute
32WHO recommends breastfeeding until the age of two years.
33A child is defined to be on track if she has completed all immunizations required for her age. At age 3 months, this
includes BCG, OPV 0-2, PCV 1-2, DPT-HepB-Hib 1-2, and rotavirus 1-2. At 4 months, this includes, additionally,
OPV 3, PCV 3, and DPT-HepB-Hib 3. At 9 months, this includes OPV 4 if OPV 0 was not given, and measles 1.
The immunization series is complete at age 18 months with measles 2. Finally, we consider a child to be on track for
vitamin A supplementation if she has ever been supplemented.
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malnutrition.34 Following WHO’s guidelines, we use the -2SD and -3SD thresholds for weight-for-
age z-scores to measure moderate and severe underweight, respectively, and 12.5 cm and 11.5 cm
for MUAC to measure moderate and severe wasting, respectively (Food and Nutrition Technical
Assistance Project 2011). According to these measures, 21% of the children in control areas are
underweight, and 5% severely so. The incidence of wasting is much lower, with 3.6% of the children
exhibiting some wasting and 1.5% severe wasting. These data, which match the corresponding DHS
figures for rural Zambia (Government of Zambia 2014), suggest that these areas are characterized
by high rates of chronic malnutrition but low rates of acute malnutrition.
The findings in columns 9-10 show that children in treatment areas are 5pp less likely to be
underweight (25% of the control group mean) and 3pp less likely to be severely underweight (55%
of the control group mean). In line with this, columns 11 and 12 show a large percentage reduction
in wasting, but given the limited occurrence of this in our sample, the effects are not precisely
estimated. The average standardized effect of the two measures is precisely estimated with p-value
0.019 for the less severe measures and 0.045 for the more severe, with the latter shown in the Table
in column 13.
The average standardized treatment effect across all variables (coded so that higher values
correspond to better outcomes) is 0.108, significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Taken together, the findings in this and the previous section show that differences in the inputs
provided by treatment and control health workers are matched by differences in facility utilization
and household health practices. The selection effect of career opportunities is strong enough to
generate discernible differences in household behaviors and child health outcomes.
7 Conclusion
Attracting effective employees is a core objective for all organizations. This can be a particularly
challenging objective to achieve for public organizations because both effective performance (in, for
example, generating health impact) and desirable employee attributes are difficult to measure. But
the stakes to getting this right are high. Our paper has shown that offering a civil service position
with career opportunities for community-based work attracts agents who deliver health services
with substantial impact. This significant effect on the health and well-being of communities is
driven entirely by a selection effect of the types of agents drawn into the position.
The civil service job we study is one sometimes referred to as a “street-level bureaucrat” (Lipsky
1980), a job where internalizing the utility of beneficiaries could be particularly helpful. Yet it was
in just such a job that offering a career in the civil service, in posters that clearly attracted ambi-
tious types, provided large impacts. Of course, the career opportunities which attracted ambitious
34We did not measure weight-for-height, an alternative to MUAC for assessing acute malnutrition, for three reasons.
First, compared to weight and MUAC, height measurement is more invasive, requiring, for children under two, laying
the child down on a height board and having two enumerators hold the child while collecting the measurement.
During survey piloting, many respondents (and the children themselves) balked at this procedure. Second, accurate
height measurement is made difficult by high measurement error relative to standard effect sizes (Mwangome et al.
2012). Finally, MUAC is a more accurate predictor of mortality (Myatt et al. 2006).
26
types—a career in the Ministry of Health—entail some social benefit, and the community-oriented
nature of the job attracted a basic level of altruism across the board. But it is in precisely these
types of jobs where it has been argued that adding individualistic benefits, such as career oppor-
tunities, might attract the “wrong” type of individual. Our experiment reveals that this is indeed
the case, as the lower-ability applicants in the treatment group have lower prosociality. Thus if
candidates were picked by a random draw we would expect fewer prosocial recruited candidates in
treatment.
In practice, however, selection mechanisms, in Zambia and elsewhere, do not choose applicants
randomly. To the extent that the mechanism picks from the top of the ability distribution, the
sorting equilibrium guarantees that these are the most prosocial. This allays the concern, often
expressed by policy makers, that offering material rewards will crowd out prosocial applicants in
education and health (World Health Organization 2006; Lehmann and Sanders 2007; Muralidharan
and Sundararaman 2013). The findings also stress the importance of giving the right incentives
to selectors. The two components of recruitment—sorting and selection—are equally important
because good candidates cannot be hired if they do not apply and improving the applicant pool is
useless unless the best candidates are selected.
Tailoring job design to attract star performers has three advantages over the more common
alternative of setting higher requirements on observable characteristics. First, these characteristics
are difficult to identify; in our case observables only explain 44% of the performance gap. Second,
requirements can only screen out those who do not meet them; they do not necessarily draw in
those who do. Most importantly, requirements create barriers to entry and rents, which can draw
in applicants attracted by rent extraction rather than public service delivery.35
The findings measure the productivity gains that come from effective selection via recruitment:
treatment health workers provide more inputs at the same cost, since wages are the same across
both treatments.36 The fact that the health workers are recruited locally from the communities
where they are meant to serve implies that there is no competition for talent across communities:
career opportunities can thus be offered in each community without losing effectiveness, as each
community can only hire from their own pool, and most communities in these areas have access to
a pool of skilled individuals who are either unemployed or in low-skill jobs.
35In this case, pay and qualifications might end up being negatively correlated with equilibrium performance
as illustrated by the evidence on effort and performance among civil-service versus contract teachers, as in, for
example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013), Duflo et al. (2015), and Kremer et al. (2013). Muralidharan
and Sundararaman (2013) find that, in rural Andhra Pradesh, contract teachers (who have less education and
qualifications) are at least as effective as regular civil-service teachers, suggesting that the substantial wage differential
(of over a factor of 5) “is unlikely to reflect differences in productivity and mostly represents rents accruing to unionized
civil-service teachers” (p. 3). We owe this suggestion to a constructive referee.
36Due to political constraints, all agents had to be paid the same amount. This implies that we cannot judge
whether agents attracted by career opportunities have a higher reservation wage, such that their higher performance
comes at a price; in other words, the government could get the agents in the control group to work for a lower
wage. A priori, the difference in reservation wages between applicants in the two treatments is difficult to sign: that
applicants to the career opportunities treatment are more skilled suggests that it might be positive, whereas the fact
that they expect to move on to better-paid positions suggests that it might be negative (in the manner thatinterns
are typically willing to forego compensation for the sake of career opportunities).
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While retention rates after 18 months are the same in the two groups, agents in the career
incentives treatment might leave their posts for higher-ranked positions sooner than those in the
control group. Whether this entails a welfare cost depends on whether they can be easily replaced
and whether the government can use their skills in other jobs. In our context, replacement is
straightforward; the number of applicants per post was above seven, and the government faces
scarcity of health staff at all levels, such that promoting strong performers to nursing and other
higher-level cadres is likely to be welfare-improving. In contexts where retention in the original
post is more important, the welfare cost of attracting agents who expect to move on will be higher.
More generally, we cannot quantify the opportunity cost of the health workers’ time, namely the
value of the activities they give up to become full-time health workers, and the size of this difference
between treatment and control. If productivity in these alternative occupations is increasing in the
same qualities that make a health worker productive, the findings imply that the opportunity cost
is higher in the treatment group. By revealed preference, we know that the private value of the
health worker job must be at least equal to the private value of these activities. Otherwise these
individuals would have not switched occupations. To the extent that health work generates more
social value than the outside option, the private and social optima coincide, and a career-oriented
position for community-based public service delivery improves social welfare.
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Figure 1: Treatment and control posters
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Figure 2: Treatment effects on the applicant pool, in theory
Figure 2b
Figure 2a
Figure 2c
The first figure presents the expected utility to applying against the payoff of the outside option. The intersections
represent the thresholds of ability at which agents are indifferent between applying and not. The upper threshold is
increasing in s while the lower threshold is decreasing in s. The second figure presents the upper threshold of ability, at
which agents are indifferent between applying and not, as a function of s. Higher monetary rewards shift the frontier, with
a larger positive effect at higher levels of s as the negative equilibrium probability effect decreases with s. The third figure
illustrates the change in composition of applicants. The applicants with ability levels not attracted in control, but attracted
in treatment, all have high s. The functional forms and equations are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Treatment effects on the applicant pool
Notes: Panel A reports kernel density estimates of exam scores in treatment and control. Panel B reports quantile treatment effect estimates on exam scores
and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Panels C and D present the mean levels of ability and prosociality in treatment and control across different levels 
of the applicant's skill rank in his or her health post. The confidence intervals are at the 95% level, based on standard errors clustered at the district level.
“Applicants” are the 1,585 candidates who were interviewed for the position. Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career
opportunities were made salient. Ordinary levels or O-levels are administered by the Examinations Council of Zambia (ECZ) to 12th-grade students, the
highest grade in the Zambian secondary education system. O-levels total exam score is constructed as the sum of inverted O-levels scores (1=9, 2=8, and so
on) from all subjects in which the applicant wrote the exam, so that larger values correspond to better performance. O-levels passed in biology and other
natural sciences equals the number of O-levels passed in biology, chemistry, physics, science, and agricultural science. Prosociality is the average of "Do you
see yourself in the community in 5-10 years" (yes/no) and the Inclusion of Others in Self scale (Aron et al. 2004). Applicants are asked to choose between
sets of pictures, each showing two circles (labeled "self" and "community") with varying degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely
overlapping. 
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Table 1: The effect of career opportunities on the applicant pool
treatment control
p-value 
(clustered)
p-value
(EDF)
p-value 
(RI)
8.9 10.0
(5.6) (6.5)
24.8 23.3
(9.8) (9.3)
1.44 1.24
(0.86) (0.89)
0.25 0.19
(0.43) (0.39)
2.34 2.51
(0.79) (0.64)
0.715 0.684
(0.45) (0.47)
25.7 26.0
(5.5) (5.8)
0.292 0.304
(0.45) (0.46)
Female 0.800 0.822 0.819
Farmer 0.415 0.470 0.349
Age 0.433 0.487 0.487
Cognitive skills (O-levels 
total exam score)
Applicants per health post 0.611 0.641 0.666
Cognitive skills (number of 
science O-levels)
Career motivation 
Prosociality
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations in parentheses. Sample includes the 1,585
candidates who were interviewed for the position. Treatment=1 if the candidate is interviewed in a
district where career opportunities were made salient. Column 3 reports the p-values of the null
hypothesis that the career treatment effect equals zero conditional on stratification variables and with
standard errors clustered at the district level. Column 4 reports the p-value using the Young (2016)
effective degrees of freedom (EDF) correction, clustered at the district level. Column 5 reports the p-
value using a Randomization Inference (RI) procedure, clustered at the district level (specifically, the
randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Ordinary levels or O-levels are administered by the
Examinations Council of Zambia (ECZ) to 12th-grade students, the highest grade in the Zambian
secondary education system. O-levels total exam score is constructed as the sum of inverted O-levels
scores (1=9, 2=8, and so on) from all subjects in which the applicant wrote the exam, so that larger
values correspond to better performance. O-levels passed in biology and other natural sciences equals
the number of O-levels passed in biology, chemistry, physics, science and agricultural science. Career
motivation=1 if the candidate chooses any combination of being an "environmental health technician,"
"clinical officer," or "doctor" in response to the question, "When you envision yourself in 5-10 years'
time, what do you envision yourself doing?". Prosociality is the average of "Do you see yourself in the
community in 5-10 years" (yes/no) and the Inclusion of Others in Self scale (Aron et al. 2004).
Applicants are asked to choose between sets of pictures, each showing two circles (labeled "self" and
"community") with varying degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely
overlapping. Farmer=1 if the applicant's main occupation is self-employment or work in the family farm
in agriculture. Age is in years. Female=1 if the applicant is female.
0.002
0.024
0.050
0.416
0.040
0.017
0.050
0.295
0.019
0.006
0.026
0.237
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Table 2: The effect of career opportunities on candidate selection by panels
=1 if
selected
p-value
of difference
=1 if
selected
p-value
of difference
=1 if top 3 in skills X treatment 0.121 0.159
(0.029) (0.036)
=1 if top 3 in skills X control 0.122 0.128
(0.038) (0.040)
=1 if top 3 prosociality X treatment 0.095 0.081
(0.039) (0.042)
=1 if top 3 prosociality X control 0.058 0.056
(0.030) (0.035)
=1 if aims to higher rank X treatment 0.097 0.093
(0.042) (0.039)
=1 if aims to higher rank X control 0.070 0.065
(0.032) (0.034)
=1 if connected to village leader X treatment 0.010
(0.040)
=1 if connected to village leader X control 0.028
(0.027)
=1 if connected to health center staff X treatment -0.038
(0.070)
=1 if connected to health center staff X control -0.001
(0.041)
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.096
N 1518 1279
Notes: OLS estimates. Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities
were made salient. All regressions include the stratification variables (province dummies and share of high
school graduates in the district) and standard errors clustered at the district level, using the Young (2016)
effective degrees of freedom correction. Independent variables are interacted with the treatment and control
dummies. Top 3 skills=1 if the applicant's exam score is one of the 3 highest among applicants to the same
health post. "Aims to be a higher-rank health professional in 5-10 years"=1 if the candidate chooses any
combination of being an "environmental health technician," "clinical officer," or "doctor" in response to the
question, "When you envision yourself in 5-10 years' time, what do you envision yourself doing?". Prosociality is
the average of "Do you see yourself in the community in 5-10 years" (yes/no) and the Inclusion of Others in Self
scale (Aron et al. 2004). Applicants are asked to choose between sets of pictures, each showing two circles
(labeled "self" and "community") with varying degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely
overlapping. "Connected to village leader (health center staff)"=1 if the candidate chooses "political leader" or
"village committee member" ("formally trained health worker") in response to the question, "Are any of your
relatives or members of your household in the following positions?"
0.62
0.68
0.98
0.40
0.57
0.54
0.63
0.59
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Table 3: Panel selection vs. random selection
treatment control
Cognitive skills (O-levels total exam score)
panel selection 27.2 25.6
random draw: median 24.9 23
random draw: 10th and 90th pctile [24.0; 25.8] [22.2; 23.9]
standard deviation (main sample) (9.8) (9.3)
Cognitive skills (number of science O-levels)
panel selection 1.55 1.46
random draw: median 1.42 1.25
random draw: 10th and 90th pctile [1.35; 1.50] [1.17; 1.34]
standard deviation (main sample) (0.86) (0.89)
Career motivation (=1 if aims to higher rank in 5-10 yrs)
panel selection 0.36 0.25
random draw: median 0.27 0.19
random draw: 10th and 90th pctile [0.24; 0.31] [0.15; 0.22]
standard deviation (main sample) (0.43) (0.39)
Prosociality
panel selection 2.55 2.55
random draw: median 2.46 2.54
random draw: 10th and 90th pctile [2.40; 2.51] [2.50; 2.59]
standard deviation (main sample) (0.79) (0.64)
Notes: Sample includes the 1,585 candidates who were interviewed for the position. Treatment=1
if the candidate is interviewed in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Panel
selection reports the average trait of the two CHAs chosen by the panels in each health post.
Random selection reports the average trait of two CHAs chosen randomly over 1000 draws.
Ordinary levels or O-levels are administered by the Examinations Council of Zambia (ECZ) to
12th-grade students, the highest grade in the Zambian secondary education system. O-levels total
exam score is constructed as the sum of inverted O-levels scores (1=9, 2=8, and so on) from all
subjects in which the applicant wrote the exam, so that larger values correspond to better
performance. O-levels passed in biology and other natural sciences equals the number of O-levels
passed in biology, chemistry, physics, science and agricultural science. Career motivation=1 if the
candidate chooses any combination of being an "environmental health technician," "clinical
officer," or "doctor" in response to the question, "When you envision yourself in 5-10 years' time,
what do you envision yourself doing?". Prosociality is the average of "Do you see yourself in the
community in 5-10 years" (yes/no) and the Inclusion of Others in Self scale (Aron et al. 2004).
Applicants are asked to choose between sets of pictures, each showing two circles (labeled "self"
and "community") with varying degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely
overlapping. 
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Table 4: The effect of career opportunities on the number of visits
dependent variable
source SMS receipts SMS receipts SMS receipts SMS receipts
time horizon months 1-18 months 1-6 months 7-12 months 13-18
unit of observation CHA CHA CHA CHA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 93.86 33.86 29.57 30.42
(37.11) (15.93) (13.47) (12.90)
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable in control 319.0 167.1 92.1 59.8
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.064 0.106
N 307 307 307 307
Median Treatment Effect (se) 104.4 (43.9) 51.3 (21.0) 46.6 (21.0) 31.8 (15.0)
EDF p-value 0.030 0.066 0.058 0.042
RI p-value 0.030 0.087 0.024 0.051
Household visits  
Notes: OLS Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the
treatment effect is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers
to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young
(2018)). Standard errors for the median treatment effect are bootstrapped and clustered at the district level. The dependent variable is 
total number of households visited over the relevant time horizon. SMS receipts are sent by individual CHAs to MOH for each visit.
Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. All regressions include the
stratification variables (province dummies and share of high school graduates in the district). Area characteristics include: number of
staff in the health post, geographical distribution of households in the catchment area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
CHA reports to have good cell network coverage most of the time or all the time.
35
Table 5: Compensation mechanisms
dependent variable retention visit duration
women and 
children visited per 
HH 
unique HHs visited visits per HH
   community 
mobilization 
meetings 
patients seen at 
health post  
emergency calls
source SMS receipts SMS receipts HMIS records SMS receipts SMS receipts HMIS records HMIS records Time use survey
unit of observation CHA CHA health post CHA CHA health post health post CHA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.0025 0.260 0.044 36.34 0.487 17.08 32.65 0.047
(0.0477) (1.849) (0.0946) (15.47) (0.246) (5.226) (260.2) (0.0581)
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep var in control 0.820 33.7 2.07 187.2 1.760 20.32 1126.6 0.460
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.012 0.072 0.121 0.125 0.027 0.030 0.006
N 307 304 142 307 307 146 146 298
EDF p-value 0.963 0.900 0.672 0.043 0.085 0.006 0.910 0.473
RI p-value 0.966 0.889 0.658 0.046 0.029 0.012 0.919 0.517
Notes: OLS Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016)
effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Treatment=1 
if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Retention=1 if the CHA still reports visits after 1 year. Visit duration is computed as end time minus start time in
minutes. Emergency calls=1 if the CHA takes at least 1 out of hours call in a typical week. SMS receipts are sent by individual CHAs to MOH for each visit. The Health Management and Information System 
(HMIS) is the Zambian Ministry of Health's system for reporting health services data at government facilities. The two CHAs are required to submit monthly reports that summarize their activities at the
health post/community level. The number of observations varies because some health posts do not submit the reports; these are equally distributed between treatments. The time use survey was administered
in May 2013 during a refresher training program. All regressions include the stratification variables (province dummies and share of high school graduates in the district). Area characteristics include:
number of staff in the health post, geographical distribution of households in the catchment area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CHA reports to have good cell network coverage most of the
time or all the time.
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Table 6: The effect of career opportunities on facility utilization
Dependent variable: total over each quarter 2011:1-2014:2
 institutional 
deliveries
postnatal (0-6 
weeks) visits
children under 
5 visited
 children under 
5 weighed
children under 1 
receiving BCG 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving polio 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving measles 
vaccinations
average 
standardized 
effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment -2.17 -12.88 -65.80 -72.88 11.01 -0.286 1.730 -0.005
(11.27) (9.314) (142.7) (133.3) (11.96) (9.118) (10.00) (0.156)
After 4.25 15.50 61.78 108.9 -1.270 -1.124 -1.168 0.042
(4.27) (5.11) (63.40) (64.07) (4.618) (3.711) (3.604) (0.058)
Treatment*After 13.65 7.79 312.1 277.8 7.147 14.60 11.19 0.278
(6.21) (9.380) (97.67) (109.7) (8.881) (4.809) (7.259) (0.092)
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable in control in year 1 45.3 55.4 1285.7 1236.1 83.0 72.4 70.4 na
Adjusted R-squared 0.348 0.215 0.254 0.253 0.151 0.151 0.118 na
Number of facilities 89 119 123 123 120 121 120 na
Number of observations 1301 1543 1618 1610 1518 1531 1535 1102
EDF p-value 0.038 0.418 0.003 0.017 0.433 0.005 0.138
RI p-value 0.014 0.455 0.010 0.033 0.463 0.003 0.134
Notes: OLS Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that Treatment*After is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016) effective
degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Treatment=1 if the health
worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Data source is the Health Management and Information System (HMIS) available monthly from January 2011 until June 2014. Health
center and health post staff are required to submit monthly reports that summarize their activities at the health post/community level. These are aggregated at the quarter level in the regressions. The variable in
Column 1 is defined at the health center level because health centers are equipped for child births and health posts are not. The variables in Columns 2-7 are defined at the health post level if this reports data, at the
health center otherwise. The average standardized treatment effect is computed using the methodology in Kling et al. (2001). After=1 after September 2012 (from 2012:4 onwards), when CHAs started working. All
regressions include the stratification variables (province dummies and share of high school graduates in the district). Area characteristics include: number of staff in the health post, geographical distribution of
households in the catchment area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CHA reports to have good cell network coverage most of the time or all the time.
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Table 7: The effect of career opportunities on health practices and outcomes
Information All
Dependent variable
% of correct 
answers in 
medical 
knowledge test
=1 if child is 
breastfed up 
to 2 years
=1 if child's 
stool are 
safely 
disposed
number of 
deworming 
treatments
=1 if child 
exposed to 
CHA is on 
track with 
immunization 
schedule
=1 if child 
has 
experienced 
fever in the 
last two 
weeks
=1 if child 
has 
experienced 
diarrhea in 
the last two 
weeks
=1 if child 
has 
experienced 
cough in the 
last two 
weeks
=1 if weight for 
age z score <2 
SD (moderately 
or severely 
undernourished)
=1 if weight for 
age z score <3 
SD (severely 
undernourished)
=1 if 
MUAC<12.5 
(moderately 
or severely 
wasted)
=1 if 
MUAC<11.5 
(severely 
wasted)
average 
standardized 
effect 
(anthro 
only)
average 
standardized 
effect
Treatment 0.002 0.051 0.121 0.225 0.047 -0.003 0.037 -0.070 -0.053 -0.028 -0.023 -0.014 0.124 0.108
(0.010) (0.023) (0.039) (0.129) (0.020) (0.037) (0.027) (0.033) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.062) (0.037)
Household controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Child controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mean of dep var in control 0.740 0.641 0.597 1.45 0.058 0.468 0.256 0.448 0.210 0.051 0.036 0.015
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.561 0.161 0.263 0.024 0.077 0.017 0.021 -0.006 0.003 0.018 0.017
N 738 613 736 659 462 731 731 731 582 582 581 581 579 376
EDF p-value 0.827 0.054 0.007 0.119 0.038 0.946 0.216 0.060 0.114 0.084 0.179 0.342
RI p-value 0.784 0.072 0.005 0.176 0.045 0.951 0.262 0.107 0.058 0.099 0.205 0.359
Health practices Incidence of Illness Anthropometrics
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value
refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. The medical
knowledge test contains 14 questions on topics that CHAs are supposed to cover; these questions were drafted by the researchers in consultation with CHA program officials and the CHA curriculum. Breastfeeding and stool disposal are self-reported. In line
with UNICEF (2014), we define stools as safely disposed if flushed in toilet/latrine. Deworming and immunization data are as reported in the child health card. A child is defined as on track if they have completed all immunizations required for their age in
months. The immunization sample is restricted to children who were 3 months or younger (including unborn) when the CHAs started working. Thresholds for weight-for-age and MUAC are taken from WHO guidelines; following these, data are restricted to
children between 6-59 months. Household controls include size, education level of the respondent, and number of assets. Child controls include age and gender. All regressions include the stratification variables. The average standardized treatment effect is
computed using the methodology in Kling et al. (2001) after recoding all variables so that higher values indicate better outcomes. For weight-for-age z-score and MUAC we use the lowest thresholds.
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Table A.1: Eligible population by treatment (randomization balance)
treatment control
 p-value
(clustered) 
 p-value
(EDF) 
 p-value
(RI) 
A. Characteristics of the eligible population
Share of eligibles in the district (18-45 year olds with grade 12 or above) .044 .043
(.205) (.203)
Share of women among the eligibles .371 .391
(.483) (.488)
Main activity of eligible candidates during the past 12 months:
not working .296 .280
(.456) (.449)
unpaid work .201 .229
(.401) (.420)
paid work .457 .437
(.498) (.496)
of which: mid skill .240 .230
(.427) (.421)
of which: low skill .484 .453
(.500) (.498)
B. Catchment area characteristics
Number of staff in health post* 1.49 1.39
(1.10) (1.17)
Geographical distribution of households in catchment area:*
Most people live in their farms, none in villages .082 .091
(.277) (.289)
Some people live in farms, some in small villages (5-10hh) 0.518 .532
(.503) (.502)
Most people live in medium/large villages (more than 10hh), a few on their farms .388 .364
(.490) (.484)
Poor cell network coverage* .082 .065
(.277) (.248)
C. Target population characteristics
Share of district population under 5 .187 .187
(.390) (.390)
Main type of toilet: Pit latrine or better** .718 .676
(.450) (.468)
Household water supply: Protected borehole or better** .361 .400
(.480) (.490)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 3 reports the p-value of the test of equality of means based on standard errors
clustered at the district level. Column 4 reports the p-value using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom (EDF) correction, clustered at the district level. Column 5
reports the p-value using a Randomization Inference (RI) procedure, clustered at the district level (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)).
Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Variables are drawn from the 2010 Census (10% PUMS sample)
except those indicated by *, which are drawn from our surveys, and those indicated by **, which are drawn from the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS),
which covers 20,000 HHs and is representative at the district level. Activities codes follow the ILO ISCO88 convention. Mid-skill includes ISCO codes between 300 and
599, namely technicians, clerical workers and services and sales workers. Low-skill includes ISCO codes above 600, namely agriculture, crafts, basic manufacturing and
elementary occupations. Number of staff in health post is the total number of nurses, environmental health technicians, and clinical officers assigned to the health post as
reported by district officials surveyed by phone. Information on the geographical distribution of HHs was obtained from a survey of the deployed CHAs before deployment.
CHAs were shown stylized maps accompanied by a description and asked to choose the one that most closely resembled the catchment area of their health post. Questions
were asked to each CHA individually so that two CHAs from the same health post could give different answers. For the 5 out of 161 cases in which the two CHAs gave
different answers, we use the information provided by supervisors to break the tie. To measure cell network coverage we attempt to call all CHAs after deployment. We
make daily calls for 118 consecutive days. The health post is classified as having poor coverage if we do not manage to reach either of its two CHAs during this period.
Main type of toilet: Pit latrine or better=1 if the surveyed household uses a pit latrine, ventilated improved pit (VIP), or flush toilet, and 0 if bucket, other, or no toilet.
Household water supply: Protected borehole or better=1 if the water supply comes from a protected borehole or well, communal tap, or other piped water system, and 0 if it
comes from an unprotected well or borehole, river/dam/stream, rain water tank, or other.
.915
.635
.846
.878
.816
.681
.640
.848
.879
.819
.685
.804
.743
.554
.416
.705
.173
.353
.917
.241
.480
.344
.919
.258
.494
.361
.371
.961
.142
.613
.522
.408
.425
.561
.916 .877
.449
.300
.825
.879
.714
.189
.724
.149
.604
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Table A.2: Experimental checks
Expected job benefits
treatment control
 p-value
(clustered) 
 p-value
(EDF) 
 p-value
(RI) 
treatment control
 p-value
(clustered) 
 p-value
(EDF) 
 p-value
(RI) 
Good future career .164 .119 .160 .151
(.157) (.113) (.122) (.108)
Allows me to serve the community .397 .436 .364 .371
(.226) (.243) (.184) (.178)
Earns respect and status in the community .037 .059 .039 .038
(.094) (.110) (.069) (.061)
Interesting job .149 .148 .132 .138
(.163) (.138) (.103) (.106)
Allows me to acquire useful skills .181 .161 .216 .219
(.169) (.137) (.132) (.111)
Offers stable income .026 .024 .038 .039
(.056) (.055) (.069) (.060)
Pays well .032 .025 .051 .043
(.093) (.057) (.089) (.067)
at entry (June 2011) on the job (May 2013)
Notes: Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. CHAs were given 50 beans and asked to allocate them on cards, listing different reasons in proportion to the
importance of each benefit for working as a CHA. The cards were scattered on a table in no particular order. "At entry" variables are drawn from a survey administered at the beginning of the training program. "On the job"
variables are drawn from a survey administered eight months after the CHAs started working. We show means with standard deviations in parentheses and the p-value of the test of equality of means based on standard errors
clustered at the district level (conditional on stratification variables). Column 4 reports the p-value using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom (EDF) correction, clustered at the district level. Column 5 reports the p-
value using a Randomization Inference (RI) procedure, clustered at the district level (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)).
.007
.078
.074
.991
.365
.683
.532
.002
.046
.031
.987
.254
.645
.414
.006
.072
.053
.988
.304
.677
.461
.644
.923
.909
.438
.894
.993
.723
.650
.914
.882
.354
.888
.989
.664
.682
.922
.893
.403
.899
.990
.695
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Table A.3: Validation of household visit measures
dependent variable
source
unit of observation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.767 0.644 0.0208 0.0154 0.0393 0.0444
(0.083) (0.161) (0.0083) (0.0173) (0.0194) (0.0162)
0.192 0.00991 -0.00261
(0.187) (0.0192) (0.0356)
Mean of dependent variable
Adjusted R-squared 0.473 0.473 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.018
N 145 145 1284 1284 1253 1253
EDF p-value of treatment interaction - 0.320 - 0.641 - 0.947
RI p-value of treatment interaction - 0.358 - 0.617 - 0.950
HH HHhealth post
HMIS
number of visits from 
HMIS records
=1 if HH reports a visit by 
CHA
HH survey
HH satisfaction: overall 
CHA's services
HH survey
Number of visits (in 00s) reported by CHA via SMS receipts
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors clustered at the health post level in Columns 3-6. The independent variable is visits reported by SMS between September 2012 and
January 2014. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the total number of visits done by the two CHAs in the health post drawn from HMIS administrative data over
the period between Septenber 2012 and January 2014. The dependent variables in Columns 3-6 are drawn from a HH survey administered to 16 HHs in each of in 47
communities where CHAs are active. Satisfaction measures range from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that
the treatment interaction is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a
Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)).
Number of visits (in 00s) reported by CHA via SMS receipts*Treatment
643.6 0.438 4.332
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WEB APPENDIX (for online publication only)
A Randomization Balance
Table A.1 describes three sets of variables that can affect the supply of health workers, the demand
for their services, and their working conditions. For each variable, the table reports the means and
standard deviations in treatment and control, as well as the p-value of the test of means equality,
with standard errors clustered at the level of randomization, the district. Table A.1 shows that the
randomization yielded a balanced sample, as all p-values of the tests of equality are greater than
0.05. As treatment and control means are very close throughout, we comment on treatment group
values in the rest of this section.
Panel A reports statistics on the eligible population drawn from the 2010 Census. This shows
that the eligibles—namely, 18-45 year-old Zambian citizens with at least grade 12 education—account
for 4.4% of the district population, and that among them, 37% are female. Just over half of the
eligible were either out of work or in unpaid employment over the past twelve months.37 Among
the 45% engaged in income-generating activities (either as employees or self-employed), fewer than
one-third are employed in high-skill occupations (such as teachers, who account for 9% of the eligi-
ble population), and about half are employed in low-skill occupations, mostly in agriculture which
accounts for 18% of the eligible population. Taken together, the evidence suggests that, despite
their educational achievements, the majority of the eligible population is either out of work or
employed in occupations below their skill level.
Panel B illustrates the characteristics of the catchment areas. These variables are drawn from
surveys administered to district officials and the health workers themselves. Three points are of
note. First, health posts are poorly staffed in both the treatment and control groups; the average
number of staff (not including the new health workers) is 1.5. Given that the aim is to assign two
health workers to each health post, the program more than doubles the number of health staff in
these communities. Second, the areas vary in the extent to which households live on their farms
or in villages, but the frequency of either type is similar in the treatment and control groups. This
is relevant as travel times between households depend on population density and are higher when
households are scattered over a large area, as opposed to being concentrated in a village. Third,
over 90% of the catchment areas in both groups have at least some cell network coverage, which is
relevant for our analysis, as some performance measures are collected via SMS messages.
Panel C illustrates the characteristics of the target population that are relevant for the demand
for health worker services. First, children under 5, who (together with pregnant women) are the
main targets of the health workers, account for 19% of the population. Second, Panel C shows that
access to latrines and—most noticeably—protected water supply is limited in these areas. Lack of
latrines and protected water supply favors the spread of waterborne infections, to which pregnant
37The 28% who were out of work are either unemployed (13%), housewives (7.5%), or full-time students (8.5%).
Most (65%) of the unpaid jobs are in agriculture. These are balanced across treatments.
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women and children are particularly vulnerable and, through this, affects the demand for health
workers’ services.
B Model
B.1 Solution
In Stage 3, we have an interior e∗(a, s) defined by sHe(a, e
∗)−d′(e∗) = 0 which is a global maximium
as Uee = sHee(a, e)−d′′(e) < 0 for all e > 0. For the comparative statics of e∗(a, s) with respect to a
and s, we have de
∗
da
= −sHea
sHee−d′′(e∗)
≥ 0 and de∗
ds
= −sH(a,e
∗)
sHee−d′′(e∗)
> 0 as both numerator and denominator
are negative in both cases. Defining H∗(a, s) ≡ H(a, e∗(a, s)), we have dH∗
da
= ∂H
∂a
+ ∂H
∂e
· de∗
da
> 0
and dH
∗
ds
= ∂H
∂e
· de∗
ds
> 0. A straightforward application of the Envelope Theorem shows that U∗a > 0
and U∗s > 0, and, finally, it is clear that U
∗
M = 1 > 0.
In Stage 1, with E(0, s,M) < V (0) an interior solution requires Va < Ea for some a. If so, there
is a threshold of ability a such that E(a, s,M) = V (a) and Ea(a, s,M) > Va(a) so that all i with
ai < a do not apply. If E(a, s,M) > V (a) for all ai > a everybody with ai > a will apply. If
however there is a value of a such that E(a, s,M) = V (a¯), it must be that Ea(a¯, s,M) < Va(a¯) and
such that only i with a < ai < a apply.
B.2 Comparative statics with respect to M
Result 1: Increasing material benefits M will attract higher-ability applicants who would not apply
otherwise ( ∂a
∂M
> 0) and either (i) lower the ability of the lowest-ranked applicant ( ∂a
∂M
< 0) and
increase the total number of applicants or (ii) discourage low-ability applicants ( ∂a
∂M
> 0) and have
an ambiguous impact on the total number.
To prove the first statement, note that the total differential of E(a, s,M) = V (a¯) implies
da¯
dM
= EM(Va−Ea) . The denominator is positive since Ea(a¯, s,M) < Va(a¯); the numerator is equal
to EM = pM (a¯, s,M)U(.) + pUM . The first term captures the effect of M on the probability of
being selected, which depends on the relative ability of the applicant vs. the other applicants; from
d2p
dMda
> 0, we assume for simplicity that the marginal applicant’s value of a is sufficiently large
that this effect is negligible. The second term is positive as shown above. Thus EM > 0 and
da¯
dM
=
EM
(Va−Ea)
> 0. Likewise, da
dM
= EM(Va−Ea) . The denominator is negative since Ea(a, s,M) > Va(a),
and again the numerator is equal to EM = pM (a, s,M)U(.) + pUM . The first term is negative
because an applicant with skill a is less likely to be selected under high M since, as seen above,
this attracts higher-ability applicants. The second term is positive as discussed above. Thus, if the
increase in payoff U∗ is larger than the discouragement due to lower probability of being selected,
then EM = pMU(.) + pUM > 0 which implies that the lower threshold decreases and overall more
people apply. In contrast, if EM = pMU(.) + pUM < 0, then the lower threshold increases, and
the effect on the number of applicants depends on the distribution of a in the population that, in
turn, determines whether the number of low-ability applicants who no longer apply is larger than
the number of high-ability applicants who only apply with high M .
47
Result 2: Under any M, the most able applicant is also the most prosocial. An increase in
M leaves the prosociality of the marginal applicant unchanged and has an ambiguous effect on the
prosociality of the average applicant.
Taking the total differential of E(a¯, s,M)− V (a¯) with respect to a and s gives Esds+Eada =
Vada. Hence ds/da =
Va−Ea
Es
. Given that Ea(a¯, s,M) < Va(a¯) we have ds/da > 0, and the
applicant with the highest a, i.e. with the highest a¯, has s = 1. This shows that for any M , the
most able applicant is also the most prosocial. As M increases, and we have da¯
dM
= EM(Va−Ea) > 0,
the marginal applicant has higher a¯ and the same s = 1, which proves that an increase in M leaves
the prosociality of the marginal applicant unchanged. Now consider two levels of M, MT > MC .
The marginal candidate when M = MT has ability a(1,MT ) while when M = MC the marginal
candidate has ability a(1,MC) < a(1,MT ). Both candidates have s = 1. Define sˆ the level of s such
that E(a(1,MC), sˆ, MT ) = V (a(1,MC)) that is the applicant with ability a(1,MC) is indifferent
between applying at the higher level of M or not. Then all the candidates who do not apply when
M is low and apply when M is high must have s > sˆ, whilst those who apply when M is low have
0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Thus the new applicants increase the mean prosociality. However all applicants with
a < a(s,MC), whose prosociality was such that they were indifferent between applying and not
when M = MC will be strictly better off when M = MT . This implies that for any a < a(s,MC),
raisingM will attract lower prosociality applicants. The net effect depends on the relative strength
of these two channels and is therefore ambiguous.
In the graphical illustration, we use H = 2
√
ξe+ a, where ξ > 0 is a parameter, and c(e) = e2.
A selected applicant thus chooses e to maximise s(2
√
ξe + a) − e2 +M , which yields e∗ = √ξs,
H∗ = 2ξs + a, and U∗ = ξs2 + as +M . The probability of selection must satisfy the following:
(i) increasing and concave in a and s, (ii) decreasing in M, (iii) ∂
2p
∂a∂M
> 0. As explained in the
main body, we use the functional form p(a, s,M) = γas
β+µ(MT−M)
1+µ(MT−M)
, where γ > 0 is set to guarantee
that p ∈ [0, 1], β > 0 captures the weight that the panel puts on prosociality, and µ > 0 scales the
decrease in probability that arises from more (high-ability) people applying in equilibrium when
M rises. For interpretation purposes, it is useful to note that the probability is 1 when γasβ = 1.
This function satisfies all three criteria: (i) is straightforward from inspection, (ii) can be seen in
dp
dM
= − µ(1−p)1+µ(MT−M) < 0, (iii) can be seen in
d2p
dMda
= µ1+µ(MT−M) ·
dp
da
> 0. Morever, for (iii), we
see that dp
dM
goes to zero as the probability goes to one. We set V = va2 + a, where we assume
v > γ which ensures that Va > U
∗
a > 0 everywhere as Va ≥ 1 ≥ s2 = U∗a . This also ensures that
Va > Ea > 0 for all a sufficiently large, as this ensures that the quadratic term in the polynomial
below is positive for any s and M . Combining these, an applicant in Stage 1 thus applies if
γasβ+µ(MT−M)
1+µ(MT−M)
(ξs2+ as+M)− c > va2+ a. This defines a polynomial of degree 2 given by φ(a) ≡
[v(1+µ(MT−M))−γsβ+1]a2+[1+µ(1−s)(MT−M)−γsβ(M+ξs2)]a+[c+µ(MT−M)(c−ξs2−M)].
The two thresholds are thus given by φ(a) = 0. The upper root is plotted for a range of s in Figure
2b and Figure 2c. It can be shown that da¯
ds
> 0, which reflects the fact that the curve is upward
sloping, while da¯
dM
is ambiguous. In the Figure, we have da¯
dM
> 0 for all s, although this is not
necessary for the main results: the important aspect for the panel’s selection mechanism is the set
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of candidates with high a and high s (i.e., in the north-east section of the graph) who will have
high probability of being selected and thus will have da¯
dM
> 0.
C Time Use
We surveyed the health workers in May 2013, nine months after they started working.38 The
survey asked the health workers to report the frequency of emergency visits typically done outside
of working hours. The median health worker does one emergency call per week, and Column 8 of
Table 5 shows that this holds true for health workers in both groups.
The time use survey is designed to collect information on hours worked and the time allocated
to different activities. This allows us to assess whether the differences in performance documented
above are due to differences in time allocation across tasks—namely, whether treatment health
workers do more visits because they devote more time to that task. To collect information on the
latter, health workers were given 50 beans and asked to allocate the beans in proportion to the
time devoted to each activity within each task. Besides household visits, community meetings, and
time at the health post, we allow for two further activities: traveling and meeting with supervisors.
For each activity, we calculate the share of time devoted to each activity by dividing the number of
beans allocated to that activity by the total number of beans allocated to all activities. The share
of time allocated to these five activities is 0.32, 0.22, 0.16, 0.22 and 0.09, respectively. We then
estimate a system of equations for hours worked and share of time devoted to each task, omitting
traveling. Table A.4 reports our findings.
Column 1 shows that the average health worker reports working 43 hours per week in the typical
week and that there is no difference in reported working hours by treatment. This suggests that
health workers in the control group do not compensate for visiting fewer households by devoting
more hours to other, possibly informal, tasks. It also provides further assurance that health workers
in the career treatment do not have differential incentives to overstate their contribution, as self-
reported hours are unverifiable and hence easy to “game.”
Columns 2-5 show that health workers in the two groups allocate their time in a similar man-
ner; thus, observed performance differences are not driven by differences in time allocation. Two
potentially complementary explanations are possible. First, treatment health workers might work
more effective hours—e.g., by taking shorter breaks over the 43 weekly hours. Second, treatment
health workers might be more efficient at their jobs. These effects might be strengthened by peer
externalities because each health worker works alongside another health worker hired through the
same treatment. Thus, health workers in the treatment group are more likely to have a highly pro-
ductive peer than health workers in the control group. Peer effects might be driven by imitation,
social comparison, or a perception that the other health worker competes for the same promotion.
38To implement this survey, we took advantage of a refresher course organized by the Government in the health
worker school in Ndola. Of the 307 health workers, 298 (97%, equally split by treatment group) came to training and
took part in the survey.
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Finally, Table A.5 tests whether health workers in the two groups allocate their time differently
within each activity, namely whether they have different work “styles.” Panel A shows that health
workers in the treatment group devote more time to counseling, inspections, and visiting sick
household members, but, taken one-by-one, these differences are small and not precisely estimated.
Health workers in the treatment group devote 1.6% less time to filling in forms and receipts and
submitting SMSs, but the difference is not precisely estimated at conventional levels. Because the
quality of reports is the same, this implies that career health workers are more productive at this
task. Panel B shows a similar pattern for time allocation during work at the health post: collecting
data and filling in reports is an important component of the job, which takes 23% of the health
workers’ time in the control group, but only 18% in the career treatment. As with household visits,
there is no evidence that health workers in the career treatment collect less data at the health post
level or that these data are of worse quality. Health workers in the two groups are equally likely
to submit HMIS reports in a given month, and these are equally accurate. Thus, the evidence
suggests that health workers in the career treatment are more productive, and this frees time for
other tasks.
D Data Appendix
In this section, we describe each of the variables used in our analysis, including its source and unit
of measurement. We collect data at each stage of the program: application, selection, training,
and performance in the field. A description of each source, including the sample, can be found in
Section E.
Eligible population and catchment area characteristics
• Number of staff in health post (source: district health officials survey, by phone) - Total number
of nurses, environmental health technicians, and clinical officers assigned to the health post,
as reported by district health officials we surveyed by phone.
• Geographical distribution of households in catchment area (source: health worker survey, in
person, at refresher training) - Health workers were shown stylized maps and asked to choose
the one that most closely resembled the catchment area of their health post. Questions were
asked to each health worker individually so that two health workers from the same health
post could give different answers. For the 5 out of 161 cases in which the two health workers
gave different answers, we used information provided by supervisors to break the tie.
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• Poor cell network coverage (source: attempted phone calls) - We attempted to call all health
workers after deployment. We made daily calls for 118 consecutive days. The health post
was classified as having poor coverage if we did not manage to reach either of its two health
workers during this period.
Experiment Validation
• Relative weight variables (source: health worker survey, in person, at training) - These were
derived from survey questions that asked the trainees to allocate 50 beans between different
potential reasons for applying to the health worker position: “good future career,” “allows
me to serve the community,” “earns respect and high status in the community,” “pays well,”
“interesting job,” “allows me to acquire useful skills,” and “offers stable income.”
• Expects to be employed in Ministry of Health in 5-10 years (source: interviewee questionnaire,
in person, at interview) - Circled any combination of being a “community health worker,”
“nurse,” “environmental health technician,” “clinical officer,” or “doctor” in response to the
question, “When you envision yourself in 5-10 years’ time, what do you envision yourself
doing?”
Performance in Service Delivery
Household Visits
Source: SMS Receipts
Each variable is constructed from SMS messages sent by CHAs in which each message corresponds
to a single household visit. The household visit receipt is reproduced below.
• Unique households visited
• Number of visits per household
• Average visit duration, in minutes
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Source: HMIS (monthly reports)
Each reported variable is the sum of each indicator’s monthly values from September 2012 to
January 2014.
• Number of households visited
• Number of women and children visited per household visit
• Number of patients seen at health post
• Number of community mobilization meetings
Time Use
Source: health worker survey, in person, at refresher training
• Number of hours worked in a typical week - Health workers were asked “In a typical week, how
many total hours do you spend doing health worker work? Please count work that you do at
the health post and in the village, including moving from household to household.”
• Frequency of out-of-hours calls in a typical week - Health workers were asked “In a typical week,
how often do you have to leave your house at night and do CHA work due to emergencies
like pregnancies or accidents?” Possible responses were “5-7 days per week,” “3-4 days per
week,” “1-2 days per week,” “2-3 times per month,” “Once per month,” “Sometimes, but less
than once per month,” and “Never.”
• Share of time allocated to - To obtain time allocations, health workers were asked to allocate
50 beans between different activities. The instructions were as follows:
Please use the beans to show how much time you spend doing each activity. If you spend more
time in an activity, you should place more beans on the card. If you never do an activity, you
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should place no beans on the card. Place the beans any way you would like. For instance, you
can place all beans on one card, or 0 beans on any card.
Household visits - Now I would like you to think about household visits specifically. Here are
some cards that list different activities you may do during household visits.
– greeting household members
– assessing and referring sick household members
– reviewing and discussing the household’s health profile and goals
– asking questions about household health behaviors and knowledge
– providing health counseling
– doing household inspections (waste disposal, latrines, etc.)
– documentation (filling registers/books and sending visit receipts via SMS)
Health Post - Now here are some cards that list different activities you may do at the HEALTH
POST OR RURAL HEALTH center.
– seeing sick patients at the OPD
– dispensing medications from the pharmacy
– helping with ANC visits
– cleaning and maintaining the facility
– assisting with deliveries and other procedures when needed
– documentation (filling registers/books and sending monthly reports through HMIS)
In the Community - Now here are some cards that list different activities you may do as a
health worker.
– campaigns for polio, measles, child health, and other health issues
– health talks and other community mobilization activities
– school health talks and other school activities
– meeting with NHC and volunteer CHWs for planning
Health workers’ observable traits
Skills
• Average test score at training [0-100] - Average score in 11 tests on basic medical practices
taken during the training program.
• O-levels total exam score (source: MOH application files) - This variable is constructed as the
sum of inverted O-levels scores (1=9, 2=8, and so on) from all subjects in which the applicant
wrote the exam, so that larger values correspond to better performance.
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• O-levels passed in biology and other natural sciences (source: MOH application files) - Includes
biology, chemistry, physics, science, and agricultural science.
Preferences
• Envisions remaining in the community in 5-10 years (source: interviewee questionnaire, written,
at interview) - Answered affirmatively in response to the question, “Do you see yourself in
the community in 5-10 years?”
• Perceives community interests and self-interest as overlapping (source: interviewee question-
naire, written, at interview) - Based on the “Adapted Inclusion of Others in Self (IOS) scale”
(Aron and Others 2004), which measures the extent to which individuals perceive community-
and self-interest as overlapping. The Inclusion of Other in the Self scale was originally de-
signed by Dr. Art Aron and colleagues (Aron et al. 1992) as a measure of self-other inclusion
and relationship closeness. The Continuous IOS makes use of the basic design of the original
IOS,39 but allows for (a) the measure to be embedded within a web-based questionnaire, (b)
the output values to be continuously scaled, and (c) modifications in the appearance and be-
havior of the measure. IOS has been validated across a wide variety of contexts, and adapted
versions are found to be strongly correlated with environmental behavior (Schultz 2012) and
connectedness to the community (Mashek et al. 2007). The measure is coded as 0-1, where
1 implies highest overlap. Applicants are asked to choose between sets of pictures, each
showing two circles (labeled “self” and “community”) with varying degrees of overlap, from
non-overlapping to almost completely overlapping. This variable equals 1 if the respondent
chooses the almost completely overlapping picture (D), 0 otherwise.
• Aims to be a higher-rank health professional in 5-10 years (source: interviewee questionnaire,
written, at interview) - Circled any combination of being an “environmental health techni-
cian,” “clinical officer,” or “doctor” in response to the question, “When you envision yourself
in 5-10 years’ time, what do you envision yourself doing?”
Other traits
39http://www.haverford.edu/psych/ble/continuous_ios/originalios.html
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• Social connections (source: interviewee questionnaire, written, at interview) - For connect-
edness to a village leader, circled “political leader” or “village committee member,” and for
connectedness to health center staff, circled “formally trained health worker (e.g. nurse aid,
nurse, clinical officer)”, in response to the question, “Are any of your relatives or members of
your household in the following positions?”
E Data Sources
• Source: Application (sample: all applicants) - Applications were submitted in August-
September 2010. The initial application stage was comprised of the initial application form,
which includes fields for gender, date of birth, village of residence, and educational qualifica-
tions. The application form also included a question asking through what means the applicant
first learned of the health worker job opportunity: recruitment poster, facility health worker,
community health worker, government official, word-of-mouth, or “other.”
• Source: Interviewee Questionnaire (sample: subset of applicants called for an inter-
view) - Written questionnaires were completed by interview candidates at the time of their
interviews in September-October 2010. The questionnaire (written in English) included a
series of questions about the interviewee’s demographic background, community health expe-
rience, social capital, and work preferences and motivations. Notably, we included a measure
employed by social psychologists, “Inclusion of Others in Self” (Aron and Others 2004) to
measure connection with the community. The questionnaire stated that the answers would
not be used for selection purposes but rather as part of a research project, although we cannot
rule out that panelists could have seen the questionnaire or referred to it when making their
decisions.
• Source: Ranking Sheet (sample: members of interview panels) - Ranking sheets were filled
and collected in September-October 2010. Each panel consisted of five members: the district
health officer, a representative from the health center, and three neighborhood health com-
mittee members. Once all interviews were completed, every member of the selection panel
completed a private and individual ranking sheet by ranking their top ten candidates. This
ranking exercise occurred before panel members formally deliberated and discussed the can-
didates. After interviewing all candidates and deliberating, interview panels were requested
to complete and submit a consensus-based “Selection Panel Report” that included fields for
the two nominated candidates as well as three alternates.
• Source: Baseline Survey (sample: all trainees) - The baseline survey was conducted in
June 2011 and consisted of two main components:
1. Questionnaire - Conducted one-on-one by an enumerator and collected information on
the trainees’ socioeconomic background and livelihood, motivations and preferences, and
expectations of the program.
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2. Self-assessment - A three-hour exam with multiple choice questions to determine the
baseline knowledge of health matters that each student had prior to the training.
• Source: Catchment Area Survey (sample: all deployed CHWs and supervisors) - Just
prior to graduation in July 2012, all CHWs and supervisors were given a short survey that
asked about characteristics of their health posts, including population density, rainy-season
information, and general community health measures.
• Source: Time Use Survey (sample: all deployed CHWs) - This survey was conducted in
April-May 2013 in Ndola, Zambia. The respondents were pilot health workers who reported to
Ndola for a supplemental in-service training to introduce new tasks as part of a revised health
worker scope of work. The survey was administered by Innovations for Poverty Action, in
partnership with the Ministry of Health, the Health Worker Training School, and the Clinton
Health Access Initiative.
• Source: SMSs (sample: all deployed health workers) - All health workers carry with them
receipt books for each visit, which require the signature of the client visited. The information
on these receipts—consisting of the data, time, and duration of the visit, as well as the
client’s phone number—is then SMS’ed in real time to the Ministry of Health and our central
data-processing facility.
F District Instruction Appendix
The health worker program was introduced differently to health centers depending on the treatment
group. In each district, the district health official was given a package that contained a script, a
memo from the Permanent Secretary, and detailed instructions about the health worker recruitment
process. In addition, district health officials received “health center packages” for each participating
health center in the district, which contained a set of posters and application forms and instructions
for the health center representative on how to post posters and collect applications. The district
health officials were to visit each health center and meet with the staff and neighborhood health
committee members to introduce the program and distribute the health center packages, using
the script provided to them in their packages. The script was only provided to the district health
officials, and was addressed directly to them. It is unlikely that the applicants or health center staff
were able to read this script themselves.
The following script was given to district health officials in the treatment group:
To Health center and Neighborhood Health Committee: I would like to you let you know
about a new government program to strengthen the country’s health workforce. Applica-
tions are currently being accepted for a new Community Health Worker position. This
is an opportunity for qualified Zambians to obtain employment and to advance their
health careers. Opportunities for training to advance to positions such as Nurse and
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Clinical Officer may be available in the future. Successful applicants will receive 1 year
of training, both theoretical and practical. All training costs, including transportation,
meals and accommodation during the one-year training program, will be covered by the
Ministry of Health. Please encourage all qualified persons to apply so that they can
benefit from this promising career opportunity.
The district health officials in the control group received the following script:
To Health center and Neighborhood Health Committee: I would like to you let you know
about a new government program to improve health care services in your community.
Applications are currently being accepted for a new Community Health Worker position.
This is an opportunity for local community members to become trained and serve the
health needs of their community. The new CHWs will work at the Health Post and
community level in coordination with an affiliated Health center. Successful applicants
will receive 1 year of training, both theoretical and practical. All training costs, including
transportation, meals and accommodation during the one-year training program, will be
covered by the Ministry of Health. Please encourage all qualified persons to apply so
that they can benefit from this promising community service opportunity.
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Table A.4: The effect of career opportunities on time use
HH visits Health Post
Community 
meetings
Meeting with 
supervisor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -.580 .007 -.021 .011 -.001
(1.01) (.014) (.013) (.011) (.008)
Area characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Mean of dependent variable in control 42.8 .312 .171 .213 .085
Adjusted R-squared .031 .055 .081 .031 .063
N 298 298 298 298 298
EDF p-value .609 .560 .085 .297 .892
RI p-value .583 .622 .140 .259 .887
Notes: Column 1: OLS Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. Columns 2-5: SURE Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level
bootstrapped with 1500 replications. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero with OLS estimates, using the
Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically,
the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Data
source is the Time Use Survey that was administered in May 2013 during a refresher training program. Hours worked is defined as the number of hours
worked in a typical week as reported by the CHAs. To measure the "Share of time spent in," CHAs were given 50 beans and asked to allocate them on cards
listing the different activities listed above plus travel. The cards were scattered on a table in no particular order. All regressions include the stratification
variables (province dummies and share of high school graduates in the district). Area characteristics include: number of staff in the health post, geographical
distribution of households in the catchment area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CHA reports to have good cell network coverage most of the
time or all the time. 
Share of time spent in:
dependent variable Hours worked 
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Table A.5: The effect of career opportunities on time alloaction
Panel A: Time allocation during household visits
share of time allocated to: counseling inspections 
filling in receipts and 
forms
asking questions 
about health behaviors 
and knowledge
discussing health 
profile and goals
visiting sick 
household members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment .006 .007 -.016 -.011 -.003 .010
(.012) (.015) (.010) (.009) (.012) (.009)
Mean of dependent variable in control 0.207 0.196 0.146 0.137 0.122 0.100
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .030 .041 .049  .026 .014 .027
N 292 292 292 292 292 292
EDF p-value .580 .627 .108 .197 .759 .268
RI p-value .594 .633 .068 .198 .795 .314
Panel B: Time allocation during work at the health post
share of time allocated to: seeing sick patients filling in forms
dispensing 
medications
helping with antenatal 
care visits
cleaning and 
maintaining the health 
post 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -.002  -.050 .006 .019 .019
(.011) (.020) (.013) (.019) (.013)
Mean of dependent variable in control 0.262 0.228 0.207 0.160 0.104
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .051 .104 .091 .094 .133
N 271 271 271 271 271
EDF p-value .827 .009 .634 .293 .112
RI p-value .783 .008 .636 .231 .133
Notes: System estimates (SURE), bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All regressions include the stratification variables (province dummies and share of high
school graduates in the district). EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero with OLS estimates, using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom
correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from Young (2018)). Treatment=1 if the health worker is
recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. All 298 participants in the refresher training program were given 50 beans and asked to allocate the beans to show how much time
they spent doing each activity within each task. They were instructed to place more beans on a card if they spent more time on an activity, to place no beans if they never do an activity, and to place
the beans any way they would like, including placing all beans on one card, or 0 beans on any card. Panel A activities are: greeting household members, assessing and referring sick household
members, reviewing and discussing the household’s health profile and goals, asking questions about health behaviors and knowledge, providing
health education and counseling, doing household inspections (waste disposal, latrines, etc.), and documentation (filling registers/books and sending SMS visits). The omitted category in Panel A is
"greetings." The sample in Panel A covers the 292 out of 298 CHAs who reported spending time doing visits. Panel B activities are: seeing sick patients in the health post, dispensing medications from
the pharmacy, helping with ANC visits, cleaning and maintaining the facility, assisting with deliveries and other procedures when needed, and documentation (filling registers/books and sending
monthly reports through DHIS2). The omitted category in Panel B is "assisting with deliveries." The sample in Panel B covers the 271 out of 298 CHAs who reported spending time at the health post.
Area characteristics include: number of staff in the health post, geographical distribution of households in the catchment area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CHA reports to have good
cell network coverage most of the time or all the time.
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Table A.6: The effect of career opportunities on facility utilization – robustness checks
Panel A. Placebo test
dependent variable: total over each quarter 2011:1-2014:2
 women giving birth at 
the health center
postnatal (0-6 weeks) 
visits
children under 5 
visited
 children under 5 
weighed
children under 1 
receiving BCG 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving polio 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving measles 
vaccinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment -3.750 -12.17 -6.500 -6.454 12.03 -3.404 3.318
(12.18) (9.392) (179.5) (161.1) (13.54) (10.59) (10.28)
After 0.864 15.43 92.22 153.5 2.659 3.843 -2.952
(3.887) (4.433) (78.05) (74.10) (5.177) (3.941) (3.808)
Treatment*After 12.29 8.409 363.8 335.3 7.949 11.77 12.66
(5.349) (9.553) (116.9) (137.4) (10.06) (5.232) (8.383)
Placebo After 7.267 0.138 -64.76 -94.40 -8.341 -10.45 3.728
(2.347) (4.528) (81.76) (66.74) (4.548) (5.173) (4.271)
Treatment*Placebo After 2.944 -1.329 -111.0 -123.8 -1.828 5.992 -3.072
(5.834) (5.206) (141.6) (137.9) (7.704) (7.841) (8.431)
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable in control in year 1 45.3 55.4 1285.7 1236.1 83.0 72.4 70.4
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.214 0.254 0.255 0.152 0.152 0.117
Number of facilities 89 119 123 123 120 121 120
Number of observations 1301 1543 1618 1610 1518 1531 1535
EDF p-value of Treatment*Placebo After 0.622 0.803 0.444 0.381 0.816 0.456 0.721
RI p-value of Treatment*Placebo After 0.599 0.808 0.418 0.381 0.810 0.474 0.728
Panel B. Health post fixed effects.
dependent variable: total over each quarter 2011:1-2014:2
 women giving birth at 
the health center
postnatal (0-6 weeks) 
visits
children under 5 
visited
 children under 5 
weighed
children under 1 
receiving BCG 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving polio 
vaccinations 
children under 1 
receiving measles 
vaccinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
After 4.975 15.46 63.77 106.9 -1.094 -1.273 -1.024
(4.167) (5.217) (66.27) (65.97) (4.790) (3.887) (3.856)
Treatment*After 13.02 8.665 306.3 278.4 8.409 15.38 11.59
(6.411) (9.840) (107.4) (119.1) (8.842) (5.321) (7.825)
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable in control in year 1 45.3 55.4 1285.7 1236.1 83.0 72.4 70.4
Adjusted R-squared 0.822 0.664 0.618 0.591 0.496 0.565 0.445
Number of facilities 89 119 123 123 120 121 120
Number of observations 1301 1543 1618 1610 1518 1531 1535
EDF p-value of Treatment*After 0.047 0.374 0.006 0.022 0.337 0.006 0.139
RI p-value of Treatment*After 0.024 0.412 0.017 0.043 0.352 0.003 0.140
Notes: OLS Estimates, standard errors clustered at the district level. Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Data source is the Health Management and Information System
(HMIS) available monthly from January 2011 until June 2014. Health center and health post staff are required to submit monthly reports that summarize their activities at the health post/community level. These are aggregated at the quarter
level in the regressions. The variable in Column 1 is defined at the health center level because health centers are equipped for child births and health posts are not. The variables in columns 2-7 are defined at the health post level if this
reports data, at the health center otherwise. After=1 after September 2012 (from 2012:4 onwards), when CHAs started working. Placebo After=1 after September 2011, halfway through the period before the CHAs started working. All
regressions include the stratification variables (province dummies and share of high school graduates in the district). Area characteristics include: number of staff in the health post, geographical distribution of households in the catchment
area, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CHA reports to have good cell network coverage most of the time or all the time. EDF p-value refers to the p-value from a null hypothesis that the treatment interaction, as specified in the
tables, is zero (in the same regression), using the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom correction. RI p-value refers to the equivalent p-value using a Randomization Inference procedure (specifically, the randomization-t p-value from
Young (2018)).
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